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This study is trying to apply the real options theory in real estate development, as 
real estate investment is irreversible and heterogeneous. This study extends the 
existing literature in the following directions: (i) a monopoly real options model is 
proposed to examine the optimal timing and intensity simultaneously; (ii) the 
symmetric duopoly model is extended to asymmetric duopoly games; (iii) the 
incomplete information is incorporated in examine the asymmetric model… 
 
The Monopolistic model shows that the uncertain exogenous economic shock and 
the demand factors contribute to the option value of real estate development. In the 
asymmetric model, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is derived under different 
levels of comparative advantage for two different developers. In the incomplete 
information model, a set of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is derived based on the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1Background 
1. 1.1 NPV vs. Real Options 
In the neoclassical economics, investment is an act of incurring an immediate 
cost in anticipation of future rewards. Real estate investment is one of the most 
important categories of asset class of investment. Investment is risky and no 
one can guarantee how much the rewards will be over a fixed holding period. 
There is always uncertainty over the future market condition at the time when 
an investment decision is made. How should an investor, facing uncertainty 
over future rewards, decide whether to invest or not. The neoclassical economic 
theory offers a standard approach to evaluate the feasibility of an investment: 
First, investor should calculate the present value of the expected stream of 
profits that the investment project will generate. Second, they should calculate 
the present value of the expected expenditure required for the investment. 
Finally, they determine whether the difference between the two, which is 
known as Net Present Value (NPV), is greater than 0. If the answer is yes, it is 
feasible to invest in the project. 
Although the NPV rule has been used widely, some of the underlying 
assumptions appear to be unrealistic. It is myopic to assume that an investment 
is reversible. It implies that a wrong investment decision can be undone and the 
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investment costs can be recovered should the market conditions turn out to be 
worse than expected. The reversible investment decision is a now or never 
decision, that is, either the investor invests now or never invests. These 
conditions may hold for some investment, they are, however, not satisfied in 
most investment decisions. In real estate investment, irreversibility and the 
possibility of delaying an investment decision are important characteristics. The 
recent development of the option pricing theory greatly challenges the 
propositions of neoclassical investment models. An investment opportunity is 
regarded as an option---- an investor has a right but not an obligation to buy an 
asset (which is referred to, in this context, a finished project that will generate 
future cash flow) at some future time. When an investor makes an irreversible 
investment, it kills the option of waiting to invest. The option to invest, like a 
financial call option, does have value. Thus the exercise of the option is 
equivalent to giving up the option to wait for possible increase in the value of 
an underlying asset, which can be viewed as opportunity cost foregone, which 
must be included as part of the investment cost. Taking into consideration of 
this option value, the NPV rule must be modified as: invest when the present 
value of the expected stream of future income is at least as large as the present 
value of the expected expenditure plus the opportunity cost, that is, the value of 
option of waiting to invest.  In Trigeorgis (1996b), the new investment rule is 
defined based on the new concept of expanded net present value, that is:  
Expanded net present value=standard (static) net present value of expected cash 
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flows +option premium.  
Studies have shown that the opportunity cost of investing can be significant, 
and ignoring it can be erroneous. Like the financial option, this opportunity 
cost is highly sensitive to uncertainty of the future cash flow. To differentiate 
this investment from the standard options on financial asset, a new term, real 
option is used in the literature. The study aims to use real options theory to 
analyze real estate investment, especially the timing problems in real estate 
development.  
1.1.2 Market Structure: Competitive Monopoly or 
Oligopoly? 
In traditional real options model, the market structure is not clearly defined. 
Although most of the literature assumes that there exists only one firm in a 
market, in the literature the investment payoff, which always follows a 
geometric Brownian motion, is assumed to be exogenously determined. The 
firm under this framework, is, therefore modeled as a price-taker, which is a 
key characteristic of competitive market. But the market structure is not 
explicitly stated in most of the existing literatures, they model the only firm in 
the market, and assume it as a price taker, which may be misleading as if there 
is only firm in the market, and thus the market cannot be competitive.  
In this study, I analyze real estate investment options that are modeled within 
clearly defined market structure, either in a monopoly market or in an oligopoly 
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market. In the oligopoly model, I put real estate investment problem in both 
real options and the game theoretical methodology. As it is commonly accepted 
that real estate market are not a competitive market due to the special 
characteristics of real estate (i.e. the product is heterogeneous); therefore real 
estate investment behavior will not be appropriate to be examined in a 
competitive market setting1.  
1.1.3 Symmetric or Asymmetric Investors 
To model the investment behavior in an oligopoly market, I assume that there 
are few investors who have equal access to the investment opportunities. There 
are different characteristics associated with the investors; Symmetric investor 
framework is a simple building block of the model, in which all investors are 
identical. The advantage of the framework is that I can expect the equilibrium 
strategies also to be symmetric, I can simply solve for symmetric strategies in 
the model. A natural extension to this is to model asymmetric investors, which 
is more realistic. In the asymmetric oligopoly model, one investor may have 
comparative advantage over other investors. The comparative advantage can 
take different forms, for example, cost asymmetry, price asymmetry, etc. In real 
estate market, the comparative advantage is more of location specific. 
This study will focus on the asymmetric duopoly real option games developed 
upon the symmetric game framework in the previous literature.  
                                                        
1 It may be, however, more appropriate to model it as monopolistic competition in well developed real estate 
market, while in the Asian context, it is more appropriate to model it as oligopolistic market 
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1.1.4 Complete Information vs Incomplete Information 
In studying oligopoly market in the real options and game theoretical 
framework, information completeness is very important. Is the information 
complete or incomplete? If it is complete, how the general Nash equilibrium 
can be derived. If not, what kind of information is not known or is private? 
How the private information is revealed in the option games, and how the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be obtained based on incomplete information? 
These are questions to be answered in this study. Both complete information 
models and incomplete information models will be developed in this study. 
Although the scenarios in incomplete information models are much more 
complex, the equilibrium strategies are still tractable based on the results from 
the complete information models.  
1.2 Motivation  
The option pricing theory, since the seminal paper by Black and Scholes (1973), 
stimulated the growing literature on real options. Real options has become a 
very important parts of the finance research, especially in the corporate finance 
research. Researches have been expanded rapidly in various industries, such as 
natural resources, R&D and others. The importance of real options theory has 
also gained attentions by many companies and interesting applications of real 
option models have been developed.  
Real estate investment is very suitable to be analyzed using the real options 
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theory. Real estate investment is obviously irreversible, or at least partially 
irreversible. Real estate market is also full of uncertainties because of the 
irregularities in real estate cycles.  
Compared to other types of investment, real estate investment has some special 
characteristics. Firstly, real estate is heterogeneous due to its spatial 
characteristics. The heterogeneity of real estate investment means that no two 
real estate projects are identical. Secondly, real estate development process is 
complex and it takes relatively long time to complete. The so called 
time-to-build feature cannot be ignored in real options analysis, especially 
when the focus is on timing games. Thirdly, real estate markets are subject to 
real estate cycles, which may be different from the common business cycles. 
Thus it is challenging to use real estate as a subject of this research and I hope 
real option theory can explain different investment behavior in the market and 
help better understanding of real estate markets, especially real estate cycles.  
The real options literatures have been growing very fast. There are, however, 
still some important questions yet to be addressed, especially the questions 
concerning option games. The underlying theory of stochastic continuous time 
game is still not well developed. This study hopes to contribute to filling the 
theoretical gap in real options research in a small way by using new 
methodology in real options and game theory.  
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1.3 Research Questions  
The basic question this study attempts to answer is: When is the optimal time 
for developer(s) to start real estate development?  This question will be further 
expanded based on different assumptions concerning the market structure and 
the information completeness. The sub-questions, all of which will be answered 
in a separate yet consistent framework, include: 
(1) In the monopoly real estate development market, what is optimal timing 
and density of development? 
(2) In an asymmetric duopoly real estate market, is there an equilibrium 
strategy for both developers in choosing their optimal timing? 
(3) If the comparative advantages of developers are private information, what 
is the equilibrium strategy and how the equilibrium strategies will be 
different compared with the case in complete information?  
 
1.4 Research Methodology and Framework  
The option pricing theory (Black & Scholes, 1973) and the game theory are 
two main techniques used in this research. 
1.4.1 Option Pricing Theory 
In general, there are two approaches of pricing options. The first one is the 
arbitrage method, in which dynamic risk free portfolio consisting of options 
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and underlying assets is made. In the arbitrage free market this dynamic risk 
free portfolio earns a risk free interest rate over a fixed interval. Following this 
argument, a partial differential equation can be derived. The second method is 
the martingale method or the risk neutral valuation, in which the option is 
priced as the expected future payoffs using the equivalent martingale measure. 
In this paper, the risk neutral valuation is used because of the following two 
reasons: (i) it is very difficult to form an arbitrage free portfolio of real estate, 
as the asset is illiquid and not completely tradable; (ii) we assume that the risk 
faced by individual developer is firm specific or industry specific risk. 
According to CAPM, there is no risk premium associated with diversifiable 
risk.  
1.4.2 Game Theory 
The option-game approach examined in this study is different from the classical 
game theoretical framework. It is neither a standard form game nor extensive 
form games. In the stochastic game, the sequence of movement itself is 
endogenous, rather than exogenous as in the extensive form games. In the 
complete information game, the equilibrium strategy is the Markov Sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium in incomplete information game 
is the Markov sub-game perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
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1.5 Organization 
The rest of this chapter outlines the plan of the study and gives a brief 
introduction to the basic ideas and results of the models. 
1.5.1 Literature Review 
Chapter 2 surveys on related literature in this field. The literature consists of 
four main parts. The first part surveys the general option pricing literature, 
which traces as far back to the classical option pricing theory by Black & 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). Some pricing methods developed by these 
pioneering researchers will be introduced in this part. The second part of the 
literature review real options model with a single firm; this part will generally 
follow Dixit & Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996b) and Pindyck (1991). And 
also some of the recent development since Trigeorgis (1996b) will also be 
introduced in this part. The third part of this review will be on game theory. 
Given the vast volume of game theory literature, it is impossible to do a 
complete survey on game theory literature, some classical game theory 
literature and selected stochastic continuous time game models will be 
discussed. The fourth part of this review is devoted to recent development in 
the real option games literature. This stream of literature forms the basic 
building block for the proposed models in the study; more detailed discussion 
will be included to highlight the difference between the existing literature and 
those proposed in this study.  
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1.5.2 Basic Real Estate Investment Model  
Chapter 3 introduces the basic model on the optimal timing of real estate 
investment. In this basic framework there is only one real estate developer with 
uncontested access to the real estate investment opportunity and at the same 
time the value of the finished project is exogenously determined. Although the 
timing problem is the main focus of this study, in this chapter, the 
characteristics of the project value are also emphasized to show the importance 
of the option premium as contrast to the traditional NPV rule. Numerical 
analysis will be conducted to examine the sensitivity of different controlled 
variables on the timing option premiums. 
1.5.3 Monopoly Real Estate Investment Model  
Chapter 4 introduces a monopoly real estate investment model, where there is 
only one real estate developer in the market that is access to the investment 
opportunity. The rent generated from the finished project is assumed to be 
endogenous in the model. The developer can choose its optimal timing and 
optimal intensity at the same time. Besides analytical solutions to the optimal 
timing and optimal intensity decisions, numerical analyses will also be carried 
out to compare the results with those obtained in Chapter 3. Besides the market 
uncertainty, the demand function is expected to have significant impact on the 
optimal timing decision. 
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1.5.4 Real Estate Investment Model in a Symmetric 
Duopoly Framework  
Chapter 5 is on the symmetric real estate investment model which is first 
generalized by Grenadier (1996a). It forms the base of asymmetric duopoly and 
incomplete information models. The main results of the symmetric model and 
Grenadier’s model will be discussed, in conjunction with possible extensions of 
the models and to discuss how the model can be extended.  
1.5.5 Real Estate Investment Model in an Asymmetric 
Duopoly Framework  
Chapter 6 elaborates the asymmetric duopoly model; which is extended from 
Grenadier’s (1996a) model by allowing asymmetric investor and asymmetric 
equilibrium strategy. One developer is assumed to have comparative 
advantages over the other by assuming that they have deterministically 
different inverse demand functions. The results show that different levels of 
asymmetry or different levels of comparative advantage will result in different 
equilibrium strategy. If the difference in comparative strength is large, the 
superior developer faces no preemptive competition from the other developer. 
It can choose its own optimal timing regardless of other’s strategy. While if the 
difference in comparative advantage is small, the superior developer will face 
preemptive competition in some cases.  
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1.5.6 Duopoly Real Estate Investment under Incomplete 
Information 
Chapter 7 extends the asymmetric duopoly model elaborated in chapter 6 by 
further relaxing the assumption of complete information. For each developer, 
he only knows his own information, but not the others. He knows only the 
information of the distribution of demand function parameters. For simplicity, 
the distribution used in this chapter is a binary distribution as adopted by 
Grenadier (2000). The Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies under different 
scenarios are derived and the differences between complete information and 
incomplete information models are examined. The results show that in some 
cases, incomplete information causes welfare loss in the sense that the 
developer will choose the timing that is not optimal if the information is 
complete.  
1.5.7 Conclusion  
Chapter 8 concludes the study by discussing the main results form the models 
and also the limitations of the study. The directions for further research will 






Chapter 2 Literature Review 
The literature on real options and game theory are two important sets of works 
that are reviewed in this chapter. The literatures are divided into four parts. The 
first part of the literatures is the option pricing theory, which forms the 
methodological foundation of real options. The second part is about the 
literature of real options model with only one firm in the market. The third part 
focuses on game theory, especially the literature on stochastic game models. 
The last part is about the option games. Both competitive market option game 
models and oligopoly market option game models are included.   
2.1 Option Pricing Theory 
The development of real option is partly stimulated by the breakthrough of 
research in the option pricing theory. Since the early 1970s, the option pricing 
problem has become an important part of the modern finance research. Given 
the large volume of the option pricing theory literature, it is impossible to 
survey all the literatures on option pricing theory. The most representative 
literature in option pricing theory is reviewed in this section.  
The breakthrough in the option pricing theory is initiated by Black and Scholes 
(1973) 1 . In their seminal paper “The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities”, they proposed an arbitrage framework for pricing financial options, 
                                                        
1 Although there are several papers on option and warranty pricing prior to Black and Scholes (1973), their results 
are almost unsatisfactory of incomplete. Among them are Boness (1964) and Samuelson (1965) and Samuelson 
and Merton (1969). The review of the early literature can be found in Smith (1976).  
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taking into account the following assumptions: 
(1) The short term interest rate is known and constant 
(2) The stock price follows geometric Brownian motion. 
(3) The stock pays no dividend 
(4) There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the stock or the option.  
(5) No restriction on borrowing at the short term interest rate. 
(6) No penalty for short selling 
 
Based on these above assumptions, they created a dynamic risk free portfolio 
made up of the underlying stock and the option. This risk-free portfolio is 
expected to earn the risk free interest rate over a short interval. Then, they 






C C CS rS rC
S S t
σ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + − =∂ ∂ ∂                         (2.1.1) 
C ---- The Option Value 
S ---- The Stock Price 
C ---- The Stock Price Volatility 
r ---- Short Term Risk Free Interest Rate 
The Black and Scholes equation is the cornerstone of option pricing theory, 
although the equation forms may vary with different assumptions. The real 
option pricing equation can also be derived using the same methodology. 
                                                        
1 1 To keep a consistent style of notation and to be consistent with the majority of the literature, the notation used 
here is different from that of Black and Scholes (1973). 
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However in real options model, there is normally no time limit on the 
expiration of the option, therefore the time dimension of the stochastic process 
is normally dropped in the real options model. 
In the same year, Merton published his paper “Theory of Rational Option 
Pricing”, in which, he firstly derived several restrictions on rational option 
pricing using the arbitrage argument. It also extends Black and Scholes 
derivation of option pricing formula by using more rigorous procedure with 
different assumptions, which include: 
(1) Frictionless markets: There are no transaction costs and differential taxes, 
trading takes place continuously; and short selling is allowed without 
restriction.  
(2) Stock price dynamics: the stock price follows a geometric Brownian 
motion. 
(3)  Bond Price Dynamics: the bond price follows a general ito’s process 
(4) No assumptions are necessary for investors’ preferences. 
 
Other major contributions of this paper are the inclusion of dividend payout in 
the option pricing formula, and also the closed form valuation of American put 
option. This paper puts option pricing in a more general framework and uses 
more rigorous mathematical derivation to enrich the theoretical strength of the 
option pricing theory. 
Although the publication of the two papers has brought the field to almost 
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immediate closure on the option-pricing theory1, the refinement of the theory is 
still a major agenda in the finance literature today. Some of the significant 
developments are discussed below.  
Cox and Ross (1976) introduce a new technique in deriving the Black-Scholes 
equation. Based on the forward (Fokker-Planck) equation and Kolomogorov 
Equation, a new technique to value the options when the stock follows some 
alternative jump diffusion processes is proposed.  
The second paper along this line of research is by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 
(1979). In their paper, they propose a simple option pricing approach by 
assuming that the stock price follows a binary process, they also show that 
taking the limit of the option price obtained in this way yields the 
Black-Scholes formula. This method, called the binomial tree method, has been 
developed to one of the three main numerical methods in solving the option 
pricing problems.2 Many real options literature also use binomial tree model 
rather than use the continuous time model in dealing with respective option 
problems.3 Merton (1976) in another important paper relaxing the assumption 
with respect to continuous stock return, which follows a discontinuous process, 
which pose some problems in replication strategy. The derived formula retains 
most of the features of the original Black-Scholes formula; it does not depend 
on investors’ preference or knowledge of the expected return on the underlying 
                                                        
1 See Merton (1998) 
2 The other two numerical methods are finite differences and Monte Carlo simulation.  
3 For example, Titman(1985), Trigeorgis (1996a) Trigeorgis (1996b) 
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stock. The work by Ingersoll(1976), which modifies the option pricing model 
to account for the effect of differential tax rates on capital gains versus ordinary 
income, is also an important improvement of the Black-Scholes model. 
2.2 One Developer Real Options Theory 
The option pricing theory has significant influence on investment theory, via 
the development of the real options theory.  
An irreversible investment opportunity is like a financial call option, which 
gives the holder the right to pay an exercise price, and receive an asset that has 
some value in return. The only difference between financial option and real 
options is that the exercise of real options has no time constraints. Thus, in real 
options the important issue is to determine when to exercise the option, i.e. 
when is the optimal timing of investment when future payoff is uncertain. 
The optimal timing problem of investment in an uncertain environment was 
first examined in the seminal paper of McDonald and Siegel (1986), in which 
they propose a simple continuous timing framework to solve the optimal timing 
problem.  
In the basic problem proposed in McDonald and Siegel (1986)1: the firm can 
pay tI to install an investment project at any time t . The expected future net 
cash flows conditional on undertaking the project have a present value tX , 
                                                        
1 In order to keep the consistency of the notation of the whole thesis, the notation used here is different from 
McDonald & Siegel (1986). 
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which is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion: 
t x t x t xdX X dt X dwα σ= + …………………………………………….. (2.2.1) 
Where xw is the standard wiener process.  
Similarly tI is assumed to follow another geometric Brownian motion
1: 
t i t i t idI I dt I dwα σ= + ………………………………………………. (2.2.2) 
The relationship between these two stochastic processes is described by a 
correlation coefficient: 
( )x iE dw dw dtρ= ………………………………………………………. (2.2.3) 
Using the contingent claim valuation 2 , the following partial differential 
equation (PDE) is derived: 
2 2 2 20.5( 2 ) ( ) ( ) 0x XX x i XI i II x X i IX V XIV I V r XV r IV rVσ ρσ σ σ δ δ+ + + − + − − =  ………… (2.2.4) 
where xδ and iδ are known as the “convenience yield” or the “rate-of-return 
shortfall” in X and I respectively, which can be calculated from simple 
CAPM.3 
By transforming the PDE to ordinary differential equation (ODE) and subject 
the ODE to a set of boundary conditions, an analytical solution can be obtained 
from the ODE. The results show that there is a trigger value given as ratio of 
X over I , at which if the ratio first reaches or exceeds the trigger value, 
                                                        
1 As shown in McDonald &Siegel (1986), to allow the cost evolve stochastically do not make big difference in the 
analysis of timing analysis and also the mathematical treatment, in the models developed in this thesis, I will 
assume the cost to be constant. 
2 The contingent claim valuation methodology requires that the risk associated with X and I is spanned by the 
market assets 
3 See Dixit and Pindyck (1996), 115-116. 
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investment will be initiated.  
The timing problem has many applications; especially in investments that 
involves large amount capital outlays, such as in natural resources and real 
estate. 
Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988) propose a model to value off-shore 
petroleum leases. They model an undeveloped reserve as an option to acquire 
developed reserves, which has a present value of X , by paying a constant 
development cost of I . The present value X  evolves in the following 
stochastic process: 
( )dX Xdt Xdwα δ σ= − + …………………………………………... (2.2.5) 
Thus, the value of an undeveloped reserve ( , )V X τ satisfies the following 
PDE1: 
2 20.5 ( ) 0XX X tX V r XV V rVσ δ+ − + − = …………………………… (2.2.6) 
The boundary conditions are: 
(0, ) 0
( *, )
'( *, ) 1
V









Majd and Pindyck (1987) examine the option to defer where the investment 
outlay is made sequentially subject to a construction rate less than 
k (Time-to-Build). The investment produces no immediate cash flow until it is 
finished. The value of the completed project evolves according to: 
                                                        
1 Here there is time constraint, thus the equation is PDE rather than ODE. 
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( )dX Xdt Xdwα δ σ= − + ………………………………………..….. (2.2.8) 
The time-to-build problem is modeled as a compound option. Majd and 
Pindyck use the total amount of investment cost left for completion, K  as the 
second state variable, and they show that the optimal investment rate is either 0 
or k . Denoting the value of the investment opportunity as ( , )V X K if *X X> , 
and ( , )v X K , if *X X< , they show that the values must satisfy the system of 
partial differential equations: 
2 2
2 2
0.5 ( ) 0
0.5 ( ) 0
XX X K
XX X
X V r XV rV kV k
X v r Xv rv
σ δ
σ δ
+ − − − − =
+ − − = ……………………..… (2.2.9) 
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They use the numerical method to simultaneously solve for both the project 
value and the optimal timing rules. They conclude that the traditional NPV 
analysis, which treats the pattern of investment as fixed may grossly understate 
the value of the project.  
Besides the timing problem caused by the uncertain asset value, Ingersoll and 
Ross (1992) argue that the uncertainty of interest rate also adds substantial 
value to the timing option. They develop a simple model of investment with a 
stochastic interest rate by using the tools developed in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
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(1985a, 1985b) 
Besides the optimal investment timing, there are also timing problems 
concerning exit or abandon options. Dixit (1989) argues that many investments 
decay or rust rapidly when they are not used. The rusting condition gives an 
interesting twist to the option pricing prediction. The asset after being acquired 
following an exercise of the option to invest will contain exit options to 
abandon the investment and revert to the original situation. Thus, when 
considering both entry and exit options, the two interlinked options must be 
solved simultaneously. 
In Dixit’s model, firm is defined by its access to a particular production 
technology. It can become active by investing a lump sum cost of k , and the 
unit variable cost isω . It can decide to suspend operation by paying a 
lump-sum exit cost of l . The uncertainty arises from the market price P , which 
follows the following stochastic process:  
dP Pdt Pdwµ σ= + ……………………………………………….. (2.2.11) 
Then the value of an idle firm 0 ( )V P  and the value of an active firm 
1( )V P satisfy: 
2 2
0 0 00.5 ''( ) '( ) ( ) 0P V P PV P rV Pσ µ+ − = ………………………….. (2.2.12) 
2 2
1 1 10.5 ''( ) '( ) ( )P V P PV P rV P Pσ µ ω+ − = −  …………………….. (2.2.13) 
There are an entry trigger value HP  and an exit trigger value LP  at which the 
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The results show that the entry is triggered when the project value exceeds the 
variable cost plus the interest on the entry cost. On the other hand, the exit is 
triggered when the project value is less than the variable cost minus the interest 
on the exit cost. The values falling between the exit and entry cost produces 
hysteresis effects, which are found to be significant in the numerical analysis.  
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) consider the entry and exit decisions in the 
natural resource investment. Their model includes more state variables that 
reflect realistic considerations in natural resource investment.  
Besides optimal timing problem, there are also many literature focusing on the 
valuation of a project with embedded real options, especially when there are 
interacted multiple real options. Trigeorgis (1993a) recognizes explicitly five 
types of managerial flexibility, namely: defer the project, permanently abandon 
the construction, contract the scale of the project, expand the project’s scale and 
switch the investment from the current use to its best alternative use. By using 
the log-transformed binomial tree, the paper shows that although every 
managerial option does have option values, the incremental value of an 
additional option in the presence of other options, is generally less than its 
value in isolation, and it declines as more options are present.   
In the field of real estate, there are also many literatures on optimal timing of 
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real estate investment. Real estate investment is at least partially, if not all, 
irreversible and large amount of capital outlays are incurred when an 
investment option is exercised, therefore it is important to consider the timing 
option.  
Titman (1985) is the first to examine the land pricing under uncertainty. In his 
paper, he uses a simple binomial tree model to demonstrate that it is valuable 
for the landowner to keep the land undeveloped for a prolonged period of time. 
Although the major contribution is in land pricing, it also points out that the 
timing decision is important in land development when there is uncertainty in 
the project payoff and investment cost is irreversible.  
Capozza and Li (1994) propose a real option model of capital replacement, 
which is then applied to urban land market. In the model the optimal capital 
intensity and optimal timing is determined simultaneously, and their results 
show that intensity interacts significantly with the timing, taxes and project 
value. The ability to vary intensity raises hurdle the rents and delays the 
development decisions. 
Sing (2000) proposes a continuous-time model for real estate development. He 
models two different diseconomies of scale constraints on the rental and cost 
variables. Sing (2000) assumes that the rental flow of a finished project, rather 
than the value of the finished project, follows the geometric Brownian motion: 
x x xdX Xdt Xdwα σ= + …………………………………………………. (2.2.15) 
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The unit cost, rather than the total cost1, follows the geometric Brownian 
motion: 
k k kdk kdt kdwα σ= + …………………………………………………. (2.2.16) 
and 
[ ]x k xkE dw dw dtρ= ……………………………………………………..(2.2.17) 
Thus the value of the development option ( , )V x k satisfies: 
2 2 2 20.5 0.5 ( ) ( ) 0x xx k kk xk x k xk x x k kx V k V xk V r xV r kV rVσ σ ρ σ σ δ δ+ + + − + − − =  … (2.2.18) 
The boundary conditions for the PDE (2.2.14) are: 
(0, ) 0
( , ) 0
( , ) / ( )
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By solving PDE (2.1.14) subject to (2.2.14), he shows that the development 
option has positive relationships with the volatility of rental flow and unit 
variable cost. While the cost elasticity of scale increases the option value and 
the rental yield elasticity of scale reduces the option value.  
Sing (2002a) tries to explain explicitly the irreversibility in real estate market. 
He lists seven important factors that cause irreversibility in real estate market. 
In the model, he uses the Cobb-Douglas production function and the linear cost 
function to determine the optimal development density by assuming that the 
                                                        
1 The total cost has the form of: iK kQ F= +  where k is unit variable cost and iF is the fixed cost. 
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developer is a price-taker.  
“Time-to-build” is another important feature in real estate development. Sing 
(2002b) uses the technique developed in Majd and Pindyck (1987), and relaxes 
some assumptions to capture the special features of real estate development.  
Another strand of real options research on real estate market is on lease 
valuation. Grenadier (1995) uses real options approach to derive the entire term 
structure of lease rates, and thus provide an equilibrium framework for pricing 
a wide variety of leasing contracts using the same methodology. Grenadier 
(1996b) provides a unified framework for determining the equilibrium credit 
spread on leases subject to default risk.  
While researches of one single firm real option models abound in literature, 
most of them made no clear definition of the market structure. Although it 
seems there is only one firm in the market, it acts as a price taker, although it is 
legitimate to model one firm in a competitive market with consideration of the 
influence of the other firms, it is still more appropriate to state the market 
structure explicitly. Chapter 4 of this thesis presents a model by explicitly 
assuming a monopoly market, in which the optimal timing decision and the 
optimal intensity decision must be made simultaneously.  
2.3 Game Theory 
The research of economic games dates back to Cournot(1838), in his book 
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Researches into the Mathematical Principles1, Cournot developed a simple 
two-person quantity competition game and introduces the concept, which is 
later called Cournot Equilibrium. Bertrand (1883) also analyzed a two-person 
game, but the focus of the analysis is on price competition. Edgeworth (1925) 
provided a simple model of monopoly pricing and production. These early 
developments of game theory offer useful insight to economic behavior, which 
have subsequently impacted on the economic thinking and the economic 
theory. 
In the famous book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) pointed out that many economic problems can be 
analyzed as games. They also introduced the strategic and extensive forms and 
their formulations. They developed the well-cited theory of two-person zero 
sum games, and the cooperative multiple-player games. 
Nash (1950) proposes the important concept in game theory, known as “Nash 
equilibrium”. This concept extends game theoretical analysis to the 
non-zero-sum games. “Nash equilibrium” means each player acts to maximize 
its own utility based on other players’ strategies. This is a natural extension of 
the analysis to Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883), which forms the important 
framework for many economic analyses. Later, Nash (1951) uses the concept to 
explicitly analyze the non-cooperative games.  
                                                        
1 This is the English edition of his 1838 book in French, Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la 
Theorie des Richesses  
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Selten(1965) and Harsanyi (1967-1968) introduce the more often used concept 
of equilibrium. Selten (1965) proved that not all Nash equilibriums are realistic 
in the extensive form games, because some of the Nash equilibriums are based 
on incredible threats. Selten then introduced the concept of “Sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium” to eliminate equilibriums based on these incredible threats. 
Harsanyi(1967-1968) provides a standard game theoretical technique to 
transform the game under incomplete information, which is later called 
Harsanyi transformation. In his game model, players are uncertain about some 
important parameters of the game situation, but they have information of the 
subjective probability distributions over the alternative possibilities. Thus, the 
original game can be replaced by a game where the nature moves first in 
accordance with the basic probability distribution, and the outcome of the 
nature’s movement will decide which particular sub-game to be played. 
Harsanyi also introduce the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where the 
players adjust their knowledge according to Bayesian rule.  
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is also restrictive in the case of incomplete 
information and in a dynamic setting, which also allows for the existence of 
incredible threats. Thus, the sub-game perfectness can be introduced into the 
framework of games under incomplete information. Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) 
sequential equilibrium and Selten’s (1975) trembling-hand equilibrium 
incorporate the sub-game perfectness to solve the problem of incredible threats. 
Although the game theory has become the major cornerstone of modern 
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economics, the application of game theory to continuous-time model is not as 
well developed. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) use the adoption of a new 
technology as a case to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing. 
They show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly. This 
article provided a continuous-time representation of the limit of discrete-time 
mixed-strategy equilibriums in deterministic cases.  Huisman and Kort (1999) 
and Thijssen, Huisman and Kort (2002) extend Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985) 
model to stochastic settings.  
Dutta and Rustichini (1995) provide a characterization of equilibriums for 
two-player stochastic games. They analyze the class of Markov-Perfect Nash 
equilibrium that holds in games in which players make continuous changes in 
the variables that affect their payoffs. In such a setting, they find the existence 
of equilibria that take the form of the two sided ( , )s S rule, where actions are 
taken when the state variable reaches a fixed threshold. In an early paper, Dutta 
and Rustichini (1993) characterize a class of Markov-Perfect equilibria called 
stopping equilibria, where they show how the solution to a single agent 
stopping problem can be used to describe all the equilibria in this class. The 
stopping equilibria form the basis for many strategic option game problems.  
2.4 Real Options under Competition (Option Games) 
Although there are many real options literature concentrating on the optimal 
timing problems, few of them are concerned about the strategic interactions. 
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However, some early researches on strategic interaction are worth mentioning 
here.  
Smit and Ankum (1993) used a simple binomial tree model to examine the 
equilibrium corporate strategies in discrete time settings. They use economic 
rent concept in determining the market structure and in attracting new entrants. 
Their results showed that competition erodes the option values. When few 
competitors have individual market power, there may be a threat of complete 
preemption.  
While Smit and Ankum (1993) examine both oligopoly and competitive market, 
Leahy (1993), Williams (1993) and Grenadier (2002) focus on competitive 
market. Leahy (1993) shows that the optimal strategy in the competitive market 
is the same as if the developer is myopic, in the sense that it ignores the further 
competitive entry and assumes the price process to be exogenous. It also shows 
that the competitive equilibrium strategies can also be solved by a social 
planner. The model goes like this: 
Consider a competitive industry comprised of a large number of identical 
developers, which have a constant return-to-scale technology with capital as its 
only input. Unit costs are constant and equals to c , and the price of a unit of 
output is given by: 
( , )t t tp D q x= …………………………………………………………… (2.4.1) 
The investment is partially irreversible and the cost of adjustment is linear, the 
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cost to increases a firm’s capital stock is k , and the cost to decrease the capital 
is l . The shock tx evolves according to: 
( ) ( )dx x dt x dwµ σ= + ………………………………………………….. (2.4.2) 
With the above assumptions and some regularity conditions, the price process 
follows: 
2
1 2 22( , ) ( , ) 0.5 ( ) ( , )t t t t t t tdp D q x dq D q x dx x D q x dtσ= + + ……………….. (2.4.3) 
Let ( )P q and ( )P q be the entry and exit triggering values respectively.  
Their results show that ( )P q and ( )P q can be solved as if the price process 
evolves exogenously without considering entry or exit by other developers.  
Baldursson and Karatzas (1997) introduce a more rigorous and generalized 
technique to analyze the irreversible investment and industrial equilibrium, 
which finally reaches the same conclusion as Leahy (1993).  
Williams (1993) is also concerned about the equilibrium strategy of a 
competitive real asset market but in a different industry structure. In his model 
the real assets can be sold in a perfectly competitive and continuous spot 
market. The aggregate demand has constant price elasticity, and the output is 
produced according to an identical, convex Cobb-Douglas cost function. As a 
result of the partial equilibrium in the real asset market: 
( / )q x y α= …………………………………………………………… (2.4.4) 
where q is the equilibrium quantity, x is the exogenous economic shock and 
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y is the rental income of the real asset.  
/dx x dt dwµ σ= + …………………………………………………….. (2.4.5) 
The aggregate supply changes according to: 
/ ( )dq q b dtδ= − ……………………………………………………..... (2.4.6) 
where b is the aggregate development rate, and δ  the depreciation rate.  
Thus the valuation function for a developed asset ( , )dV x q satisfies: 
2 2 1/0.5 ( ) ( ) 0d d d dxx q xx V b qV xV l V xq
ασ δ ρ δ −+ − + − + + = …………….. (2.4.7) 
The PDE (2.4.7) can be solved subject to the following boundary conditions: 
(0, ) 0dV q = …………………………………………………………...... (2.4.8) 
1/( , )dV x q vxq α−≤ …………………………………………………….… (2.4.9) 
The undeveloped assets can be valued similarly.  
In equilibrium all developers solve the problem: 
2 2 10 max 0.5 ( * ) ( )}
n
u u u u d u
xx n q x nb
vx V b b qV xV lV b V V
v
νσ δ ρ γθ
−⎧ ⎫= + + − + − + − −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
 
In a Markov sub-game perfect equilibrium, each player has a strategy that 
depends on the history of game only through the Markovian state variables.  
Grenadier (2002) provides a tractable approach to derive the equilibrium 
strategy in a continuous time Cournot-Nash framework. He shows that while 
the standard real options models emphasize the valuable option to wait, the 
impact of competition drastically erodes the value of option to wait, which 
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leads to an investment decision at very near the zero net present value 
thresholds. It also shows in some cases that the equilibrium strategy can be 
reached by assuming myopic investors. The development in competitive 
equilibrium is also found in Grenadier’s (2003) work which provides a unified 
equilibrium approach to value a variety of commercial real estate lease contract. 
Using the game theoretical approach and the real options model, the underlying 
asset market is modeled as a continuous, competitive Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium market. The modeling approach on the underlying real estate 
market is essentially the same as Grenadier’s (2002) paper. 
Compared with the monopoly and the competitive market, fewer researches 
have been done on the oligopoly market. Smets (1991) uses the real options 
theory to explain the oligopoly market of foreign direct investments. The basic 
idea of Smet (1991) model is discussed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
Uncertainty and irreversibility imply that an option of waiting is valuable. 
While the fear of preemption by a rival, on the other hand, suggests the need to 
act quickly. In this model, with only two firms in the market, both of which 
have the potential to produce a unit output flow, which can be activated by 
incurring suck cost of I . The inverse demand function of the market is: 
( )P YD Q= ……………………………………………………………. (2.4.10) 
Where the economic shock Y follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
/dY Y dt dwµ σ= + …………………………………………………... (2.4.11) 
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Following the general step of solving dynamic game, the follower’s strategy is 
firstly solved conditional on that the leader has already invested. Following 
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⎧ <−⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ ≥⎪ −⎩
…………………. (2.4.14) 
By comparison of the leader’s value and the follower’s value, a class of 
Markov sub-game perfect equilibrium can be established.  
Grenadier (1996a) extends Smets’ (1991) approach to develop the duopoly real 
options theory to explain the behavior of real estate market. This model will be 
introduced in detail in chapter 5.   
In Grenadier (1996a), Dutta and Rustichini (1995), they made assumptions that 
ignore the possibility of non-optimal simultaneous investment, Huisman and 
Kort (1999) propose a symmetric duopoly model by incorporating the 
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technique developed in Fudenberg and Tirole(1985). Other papers on the 
oligopoly market are developed for analyzing technology investment or 
technology adoptions, using both real options model and game theory method 
proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). Huisman (2001) offers a good 
collection of literature in this field.  
While most of the literature concentrates on symmetric oligopoly, Grzegorz and 
Kort’s (2002) model is an exception. They try to explain the cost asymmetry 
and the advantage of comparative disadvantage. In this paper the demand 
asymmetry and the equilibrium strategy of various strategies for different level 
of comparative advantage and different initial economic shock are also 
evaluated. 
In chapter 6, two asymmetric developers facing different market demand due to 
the heterogeneity of real estate market will be modeled. The extent of 
asymmetry and its influence on the structure of the equilibrium strategies, 
determine the comparison of the values of the two developers.  
In the game theoretical real options model, a natural extension should be the 
cases under incomplete information. Grenadier (1999) proposes an incomplete 
information game, in which the information is revealed through option exercise. 
The general assumption of the model goes like this: 
There are n agents in the market; each agent holds an identical call option. 
However the precise payoff upon exercising is not fully known to any of the 
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agents. In particular each agent holds an independent signal of the true realized 
payoff from exercising the option. In this incomplete information model, the 
payoff from the option exercise includes an unobserved random variable,θ . 
The net payoff is, ( )X t Iθ −  where ( )X t may be interpreted as the value of a 
typical underlying asset, which follows an exogenous geometric Brownian 
motion: 
/dX X dt dwµ σ= +  …………………………………………………. (2.4.15) 
At time 0, θ is unknown, however each agent holds an independent sign as to 







= +∑  ………………………………………………………… (2.4.16) 
Where iS is i.i.d with expectation of 0. More specifically iS  has a very simple 













The information available to each agent is his private signal and observed 
actions.  
Based on these assumptions, Grenadier (1999) derived a class of equilibrium 
strategies and also the equilibrium option value for all agents. The endogenous 
exercising cascade is also discussed based on the equilibrium strategies.  
Besides Grenadier (1999), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003)also study the real 
options model under incomplete information with different assumptions: There 
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is a full preemption threat, which means if one firm invests first, then the other 
developer may lost the investment opportunity. The parameter for private 
information is continuously distributed and adjusted according to the Bayesian 
rule. In another paper by Martzoukos and Zacharias (2001), the two authors 
study the real options game under incomplete information when there is a 
spillover.  
In chapter 7, a simple way to model incomplete information is presented. While 
some of the assumptions are the same as in Grenadier (1999), duopoly game 
model assumes that payoff upon option exercise is not exogenous, but is an 















Chapter 3 One Firm Model Facing Exogenous Rental 
Flow 
In this chapter, I present a very simple model of real estate investment, in 
which there is only one developer in the market and who faces exogenous 
rental flow. The development intensity is exogenously determined and is 
normalized to be 1. I will also show that in this simple model, there is an option 
value of waiting to invest; and the developer should start development when 
the profit exceeds the cost to a significant positive amount. Thus there is the so 
called optimal timing of real estate development.  
3.1 Model Assumptions 
In the set up of the model, there is only one real estate developer in the market 
who has access to the real estate investment opportunity. The cost of 
investment I is irreversible, deterministic and constant. The rental of the 
finished project is exogenous, which follows a geometric Brownian motion1: 
dR Rdt Rdµ σ ω= + ……………………………………………………. (3.1.1) 
Another assumption is that developer is value maximizing and risk-neutral. The 
                                                        
1 In this study, all the stochastic variables will be assumed to be geometric Brownian motion. There are also vast 
volume of literatures studying other processes such as mean-reverting process and poison process, but there is no 
significant difference in timing options, thus I will only study geometric Brownian motion.  
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justification of risk neutral is that the risk faced by the developer is developer 
specific or industry specific, thus the risk is not correlated with the market risk.  
Some other assumptions are similar to that of option pricing theory: 
(1)The short term interest rate is known and constant, denoted as r  
(2)No restriction on borrowing at the short term interest rate1. 
(3)No penalty of short selling 
3.2 The Model 


















τ  is the time to build.  
Thus the value of the developer is a function only of R 2. According to Ito’s 
Lemma: 
2 2 21 1'( ) ''( )( ) [ '( ) ''( )] '( )
2 2
dV V R dr V R dr RV R R V R RV R dµ σ σ ω= + = + + . (3.2.2) 
As the developer is risk neutral, to avoid arbitrage, I have: 
EdV rRdt= ……………………………………………………………. (3.2.3) 
                                                        
1 Actually this is not essential in risk neutral valuation since we are not interested in forming a risk free portfolio. 
2 Previous study has shown that for perpetual option, the option value is not a function of time to maturity t . 
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E is the notation of expectation. 
Thus the following ordinary differential equation (ODE) is obtained: 
2 21'( ) ''( )
2
RV R R V R rRµ σ+ = ………………………………………… (3.2.4) 
To solve the ODE, some boundary conditions are needed. The optimal stopping 
theory states that, there is a trigger value of the rental flow *R , at which the 
developer will start development1. Mathematically the optimal timing of real 
estate development is defined by inf{ 0 : *}T t R R= ≥ ≥ . At the trigger value, 
there are two boundary conditions: the value matching condition and smooth 
















= − ……………………………………………………….. (3.2.6) 
There is also a natural boundary condition: 
0)0( =V    ……………………………………………………………. (3.2.7) 
The general solution to ODE (3.2.4) has the form: 
1 2
1 2( )V R B R B R
β β= + ……………………………………..……………. (3.2.8) 
1β  and 2β are the solution to the following quadratic equation: 
0)1(
2
1 2 =−+− rµβββσ …………………………………………….. (3.2.9) 
Thus we have,  
                                                        
1 See Harrison and Oksendal (1998)  
2 See Dixit (1992) 
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2 2 2 2
1 2
( 1/ 2 ) ( 1/ 2 ) 2
1
rµ σ µ σ σβ σ
− − + − += > ……………………… (3.2.10a) 
2 2 2 2
2 2
( 1/ 2 ) ( 1/ 2 ) 2
0
rµ σ µ σ σβ σ
− − − − += < …………………..… (3.2.10b) 
According to the boundary condition (3.2.7), 02 =B . 
According to the boundary conditions (3.2.5) and (3.2.6), the following system 
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……….………….. (3.2.12) 





rR r e Iµ τβ µβ
−= −− ……………………………………………. (3.2.13) 
The following proposition summarizes the above results. 
Proposition 1 (Optimal Timing of One Developer Real Estate Market) 
If there is only one real estate developer in the market which  is accessible to 
the real estate investment opportunity and faces exogenous rental flow, the 
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3.3 Neoclassical Cases 
In the neoclassical case, when the net present value is equal to 0, the developer 
should start development.  
**( ) rt
T





=∫ …………………………………………………... (3.3.1) 






−= ……………………………… (3.3.2) 
Simple manipulation shows that: 
* **R R> ……………………………………………………………..... (3.3.3) 
which implies that the real options trigger value is larger than that of the 
neoclassical theory.  







Basic Scenario:  
Table 3-1 the Basic Values of Relevant Variables1  
Variables Basic Value 
Risk Free Interest Rate ( r ) 8% 
Instantaneous Change Rate of Rental 
Flow (µ ) 
6% 
Constant Investment Cost ( I ) $150000 
Rental Volatility (σ ) 0.5 
Time to Build (τ ) 2 
 
3.4.1 The Optimal Timing  
The impact of uncertainty on the optimal timing, i.e. the change of the trigger 
value with the change of the uncertainty of the risk associated with the future 
rental flow will be evaluated: 
                                                        
1 Since this is a general model, calibrating the model is impossible, thus I just choose the plausible numerical 
parameter value without calibration. It is still appropriate to do this while the purpose is only to show the waiting 
to invest effect 
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Figure 3-1 shows the trigger value of the optimal timing as a function of the 
rental volatility. It shows that the trigger value increases with the rental 
volatility, which means that an increase in rental risk also increases the 
opportunity cost of the development thus requires a higher option premium for 
the real estate development. The intuition of the finding is that high risk 
depresses real estate investment for a rational developer. 
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3.3.2 The Developer Value 




































Figure 3-2 shows that, the developer value increases with the increase of the 
risk. The impact of the volatility of the future rental flow on the developer’s 
option value is examined. The developer can benefit from the entire positive 
amount that deviate form the expected future cash flow. While for the negative 
part, as the developer holds the option to wait, it has the option not to develop 
under bad conditions, thus the developer can protect itself from bad market 
condition. This asymmetry in the payoffs causes that the developer value to 




In this chapter, the real estate development market in the simplest theoretical 
framework is examined. The basic assumption in this simple model is that there 
is only one real estate developer who faces exogenous future rental flow. The 
model shows that the risk or the uncertainty in future rental flow depresses real 
estate investment as the trigger value of real estate developer increases with the 
volatility of future rental flow. The model also shows that although uncertainty 
depresses real estate investment, the developer’s value does increase with the 
uncertainty because of the asymmetric influence of the future rental flow 












Chapter 4 Monopoly Real Estate Developer Model 
------ Optimal Timing and Optimal Intensity of Real 
Estate Development 
In Chapter 3, the one developer model is examined, where the only developer 
faces exogenous rental flow. The obvious problem of the simple model is that 
the model keeps silent on the market structure. In this chapter, however, the 
monopoly real estate development market will be modeled, where the 
developer will make timing and intensity decision simultaneously.  
4.1 Introduction 
The timing and intensity of investment are two important decisions faced by 
investors in the process of selecting their production capacity. Real estate 
development is a typical capital investment process, where a developer 
possessing a developable land has to decide on when to start developing the 
land and how much to build on the land, given the fact that zoning dictates the 
particular use type permitted on the land. The timing question has been 
extensively studied in the real option and optimal stopping time literature 
(McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Titman, 1985; Clarke and Reed, 1988; Williams, 
1991, et. al.). Pindyck (1988) first examines the capacity choice issue in an 
irreversible investment framework. When investment is not perfectly reversible, 
he found that developers hold less capacity than they would when the demand 
is uncertain. In his model, the “lumpiness” of capital investment is ignored. The 
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developers are, therefore, assumed to have the flexibility of increasing their 
capacity as and when the needs arise.  
This flexible capacity choice assumption may not be realistic in the real estate 
development process. Firstly, there are statutory planning and technical 
constraints on the maximum permissible density of development on a land 
parcel. Secondly, when the foundation and floor plate of a building are set, it 
will be costly to reverse the intensity decision on the land. The costs incurred 
are sunk. The investment is though not strictly irreversible, any expansion of 
the land use capacity in the future would, however, come at a high cost. 
Therefore, the intensity and timing decisions of a development are important 
decisions, which are often made simultaneously in a real estate development 
process (Williams, 1991; Capozza and Li, 1994). In other words, the 
development intensity must be decided at the time the development option is 
exercised. 
In most of the earlier real option models, prices or rental cash flows are used to 
proxy investment payoffs. The price generating processes are assumed to 
follow specific exogenous stochastic processes (Williams, 1991; Clarke and 
Reed, 1988; Capozza and Helsley, 1989 and 1990; Capozza and Sick, 1994). 
Under this assumption, developers are price takers who could not influence the 
price process in the future. The assumption is only valid in a perfectly 
competitive market, where there exists multiple buyers and sellers that will set 
the equilibrium price. However, in most of the earlier real option models, there 
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is always only one agent that is modeled, who does not face any market 
competition. It may lead to misunderstanding that this agent is a monopolistic 
one, while given the monopolistic right; the developer’s investment decision 
will always have significant influence on the price behavior of the product. The 
developer is known to be a price-setter. In a real monopoly model, the 
exogenous price function is, inconsistent in the real option model setting with 
only a single monopolistic developer. The solution of the real option models 
offers at best a partial equilibrium option estimate for a perfect competitive 
market. 
The real estate market with the characteristics of product segmentation and 
high barrier of entry for new players is truly not a competitive market1. Few big 
players, instead, dominate the market and establish significant monopolistic 
influence on the supply and pricing of the products. The price setting behavior 
of the developers contradicts with the exogenous price assumption in most of 
the real option models on development timing (Williams, 1991; Clarke and 
Reed, 1988; Capozza and Helsley, 1989 and 1990; Capozza and Sick, 1994). To 
reflect the monopolistic power of the developer in a sub-sector of real estate 
market, we model the development timing options using a more general 
demand shift variable in place of the stochastic price function (Pindyck, 1988). 
In this model setting, the developer is a monopolist, and yet his/her investment 
decision is not restricted by the exogenous price function, but is driven by the 
                                                        
1 This may not be true in well developed market, but is true for most emerging markets in Asia. 
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demand shift variable. 
The optimal development intensity of land parcels is another issue examined by 
Williams (1991) and Capozza and Li (1994). In their models, they assume that 
the developer can optimally pick the development density of a land at the time 
of exercising the investment option. The optimal density is independent of the 
cost and price functions, and it is fixed once determined. We relax the 
assumptions in Williams (1991) and Capozza and Li (1991) models by 
modeling the density as an endogenous variable in the price and cost 
functions.1 By imposing the microeconomic structure to the price and cost 
functions with monotonic elasticity of scale, the capital choice and 
development timing decisions are no longer separable. The optimal density 
decision affects the boundary conditions, which in turn affect the estimation of 
the development timing option premium in the proposed model. Therefore, the 
optimal density and the optimal timing of a development will have to be 
simultaneously and jointly solved in the proposed real options models.  
4.2 Problem Specification 
Real estate market is generally characterized by its heterogeneous and 
immobile nature of its products. Developers with sufficiently large capitals and 
strong track records could exert monopoly power in a particular segment of 
                                                        
1  Unlike in Williams’s (1991) model, there is no statutory zoning restriction that imposes a 
maximum permissible density of the land in our model and the model by Capozza and Li 
(1994). 
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markets. In our model with few homogeneous developers, the market is not 
perfectly competitive. The monopolistic influence of developers on the supply 
would indirectly determine the market prices and rental cash flows of 
developed property. Therefore, the exogenously defined stochastic price and 
rental functions are not feasible in our framework. The underlying driver of the 
investment decision is represented in our model by a stochastic economic shock 
variable that follows a multiplicative diffusion process. 
To set up the framework of our model, we assume that the developer has 
already acquired a vacant land. The decision faced by him is “when” and “how 
much” to develop on this parcel of land. When dealing with the first problem of 
deciding on when is the optimal time to develop, the decision is not a straight 
forward binary choice of “now or never” as predicted by the traditional net 
present value (NPV) rule. When the market is volatile, the simple rule of “NPV 
greater than or equal to zero” is no longer applicable. Instead, many real 
options models (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Clarke and Reed, 1998; Sing 
2000; et al) have suggested that the developer should only initiate the 
development when the profit exceeds the cost by an amount that is 
commensurate with giving up the options of waiting for another period. 
The question of intensity of development if ignored in the real options models 
will lead to under-estimation of the urban land prices (Williams, 1991; Capozza 
and Li, 1994). The flexibility given to the developer in adjusting the density of 
development will interact in a positive and significant way to the conversion 
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option premiums especially when the market value for the urban land use is 
volatile. In a monopolistic market framework, the intensity of development will 
have a direct influence on the price and rental cash flows of the developed real 
estate. Therefore, unlike in Williams (1991) and Capozza and Li (1994) models, 
the density variable in our model is defined as endogenous functions of demand 
and supply of the undeveloped lands. The functional forms of the demand and 
supply equations, which are dependent on the density variable, will have 
significant effects on the timing options.  
As real estate investment is lumpy and indivisible, the sequential expansion and 
marginal increase in capacity investment processes like those advocated in the 
capacity choice (Pindyck, 1988) and the time to build literature (Majd and 
Pindyck, 1986; Sing, 2001) may not be feasible. We, instead, follow the 
assumptions in Williams (1991) and Capozza and Li (1994) models, which 
require that the intensity decision will have to be made concurrently and 
simultaneously when the timing of development is decided. 
4.3 The Model 
Assuming that the developer is facing the following inverse demand function: 
)(QYDR =                                                  (4.31) 





dY σµ +=                                              (4.3.2) 
µ  is the expected changing rate of Y, σ is the instantaneous volatility of Y. 
dw is the increment of the standard wiener process. And to make things simple, 
we assume that the risk associated with Y is developer specific or is not related 
to the market risk. And D(.) satisfies the following condition: 
0)(' <QD                                                  (4.3.3a)  
I also assume that the developer is facing a cost function of the form which is 
assumed to be deterministic: 
)(QCC =                                                   (4.3.4) 
I have the constraint for the first order derivative of the cost function,  
0)(' >QC                                                  (4.3.5a) 
As well documented in the literature, the owning of a vacant land can be 
viewed as the holder of a call option, let V denote the value of the 
development option, and V  is the function only of Y , because the call option 
has infinite maturity, thus  
)(YVV =                                                   (4.3.6)   
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VY µσ                                   (4.3.8)   
To solve the ODE (8), we need some boundary conditions, which is the 
behavior of the developer at the beginning of the development. There exits a 
trigger value of *Y , at which the development will start. Or mathematically the 
development will occur at time *)(,0inf[ YTYTT =≥=  ]. At time T, the value 





µ                                (4.3.9) 
(4.3.9) reflects the fact that the value of the project is the discounted future cash 
flow. 
τ  is time to build, which is assumed to be constant over time. 
As mentioned in the previous section, at the beginning of the development, the 
developer will also made the decision of development intensity, which is to 
maximize (9) given *Y . 




V                                                    (4.3.10) 
Here we must make explicit assumption of the form of the inverse demand 
function and the cost function: 
bQaQD −=)(                                              (4.3.11) 
dQcQC +=)(                                              (4.3.12) 
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aq −=                                           (4.3.13) 
For equation (13), I must also have another constraint which is: 
0≥q                                                     (4.3.14) 
























aq  (4.3.15) 
and  
0)( * =YV  otherwise                                        (4.3.16) 
 
Figure 4-1 Value Function of the Developer 
Figure 4-1 plots the payoff function corresponding to (4.3.15) and (4.3.16). The 
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part of the dotted line is trimmed because of the constraint (4.3.14).  
(4.3.15) and (4.3.16) are equivalent to the traditional value matching condition, 
and here we also have the smooth pasting condition, which ensure that T is the 









KaYV −=                                      (4.3.17)  
And also there is a natural boundary condition: 
0)0( =V                                                   (4.3.18) 
Because 0=Y  is the absorbing barrier of geometric Brownian motion, and 
the developer shall never exercise the option, i.e. start development. 
ODE (8) is homogenous second order differential equation and has the general 
solution of the form: 
21
21)(
ββ YBYBYV +=                                        (4.3.19) 
1β  and 2β are the solution to the following quadratic equation: 
0)1(
2
1 2 =−+− rµβββσ                                     (4.3.20) 
Thus we have,  
2 2 2 2
1 2
( 1/ 2 ) ( 1/ 2 ) 2
1
rµ σ µ σ σβ σ






σσµσµβ r                (4.3.21b) 
According to boundary condition (4.3.16), 02 =B  
Then according to boundary conditions (4.3.14) and (4.3.15), we get the 
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KaYB −=−ββ                                  (4.3.22b) 
Fortunately this system of equations can be solved analytically, there are 








































KYaB                   (4.3.24) 
This corresponds to the value function 1 in figure (4.1).  








































KYaB                   (4.3.26) 
The second solution corresponds to the value function 2 in figure 4.1, which is 
not plausible given the constraint (4.3.14). Thus we only have the solution 
(4.3.24) and (4.3.25) 






aq −=                                           (4.3.27) 
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Summary of the Theoretical Results: 
Given the assumptions in the previous section, the monopoly real estate 
developer will have the following value function: 
1
1)(










−−+=   for *YY ≥                 (4.3.28b) 








































KYaB                   (4.3.30) 
And optimal timing decision is: when the economic shock arrives at *Y  the 
first time, exercise the development option, or mathematically, 
*])(,0inf[ YTYTT =≥= , T is just the optimal timing of development. 






aq −=                                           (4.3.31) 
4.4 Numerical Results and Comparative Static Analysis 
Consider a proposed project of real estate development, and the parameters are 
estimated as shown in Table 4-1.  
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Table 4-1: Input Assumptions for Numerical Analyses 
Input Parameter Base Value 
Instantaneous drift of economic shock 0.06 
Volatility of economic shock 2.0=σ  
Fixed cost c = $5x106 
Variable cost (psm) 200$=d 0 
Demand parameter 1 5000$=a  
Demand parameter 2 (psm) 5.0$=b  
Risk free interest rate %10=r  
Time-to-build (year) 3=τ  
 
Then the optimal timing and optimal intensity rules are analyzed numerically 
and also the comparative static analysis with changing parameters.  
4.4.1. The Volatility Effect  
(1) Optimal Timing 
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Figure 4-2 shows that the trigger value of the economic shock increases with 
the volatility. This result is the same with the traditional real option analysis 
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994), which shows that the more risky the world is, the 
developer will be more unwilling to develop the project earlier. This result can 





Y . This means that investment is highly sensitive to the 
volatility in economic shock, and high uncertainty of the economic shock will 
tend to depress investment.  
(2) Optimal Intensity 
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Figure 4-3 is the optimal development intensity under different volatility of the 
economic shock. And the optimal intensity increases with the volatility. This is 
understandable because the trigger value in figure 4-1 and the optimal intensity 
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q . This result is 
important because it is great motivation for the developer to wait because with 
higher trigger value the developer can also develop more under better market 
condition, which results even larger profit. While the traditional real option 
analyses only consider the optimal timing, they ignored the value of optimal 
intensity.  
(3) The Value of the Development Option 




































Figure 4-4 shows the option value of the development under different volatility 
of the economic shock. In each case the tangency point of the option value with 
the payoff function at the optimal timing gives the trigger value of the 
development. Note that the option value increases when the volatility increases, 
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which means that greater uncertainty increases the value of the development 
opportunity. This is also the same with the traditional real option analysis as 
shown in (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
4.4.2. Demand Effect 
In this section we will examine the effect of the demand on the behavior of the 
developer. The major parameter of demand in the demand is b which measures 
the rent sensitivity of housing demand (while the rent elasticity of demand is 
changing with the rent, we will not use the jargon elasticity here, although in 
any given level of rent, higher b means lower elasticity. But we will still make 
use of this characteristic of b to compare the result with the traditional 
microeconomic analysis of monopoly where usually elasticity is used.) The 
greater the b, the less sensitive the housing demand with respect to the rent 
level. This effect is new in this article while other models of real option always 
assumes that the developers are price taker and the demand is insensitive to the 
rent change, which I have shown is not plausible in real estate market; while in 



























Figure 4-5 plots the trigger value of different b. The trigger value increases 
with the b, which means that the lower the rent sensitivity of demand, the larger 
the trigger value of the economic shock. Lower rent sensitivity also depresses 
the development. Thus we can conclude that price elasticity of the demand will 
result in deferment of the development. 





























Figure 4-6 depicts the relationship between optimal intensity of development 
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and the rent sensitivity of housing demand. The result shows that the optimal 
intensity decreases when the rent sensitivity of demand decreases or when b 
increases. This result is the same with the traditional analysis of monopoly, 
which says that low price elasticity will result in lower output. 





































Figure 4-7 plots the option value of development of different b, the inverse of 
the rent sensitivity of the housing demand. The result says that the smaller the b 
or the higher the rent sensitivity, the higher the option value. And the result also 
show that the higher rent sensitivity contributes much to the total option value, 
and as mentioned earlier both the uncertainty and the higher rent sensitivity 
make the waiting option valuable. 
4.4.3. Other Effects 
Table 4-2 shows that the comparative static analysis of other parameters which 
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has been shown in table 4-2 
Table 4. 2: Comparative Statics 










Drift (µ ) 
- - + 
Fixed Cost © + + - 
Variable Cost 
(psm) (d) 
+ - - 
Demand 
Parameter 1(a) 
- + + 
Risk Free 
Interest Rate ® 
- - + 
Time-to-Build 
(year) (τ ) 
+ + - 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The optimal timing problem has been extensively studied in the real options 
literature. However, most of the models make two contradictory assumptions 
with respect to the price function and the market structure. On one hand, the 
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models assume that there is only one firm in the market who face no 
competition from future entry. On the other hand, the models invariable specify 
the price function as an exogenous stochastic process, and the price changes are 
independent of the demand shocks in the market.  
The proposed real development option model in this paper reconciles the two 
conflicting assumptions, so as to provide a more realistic framework to analyze 
the optimal timing and optimal intensity decisions faced by real estate 
developers. While maintaining the monopolistic structure of the real option 
model, which is consistent with the characteristic of many real estate 
sub-markets that are dominated by few large and financially strong developers, 
we relax the rigid assumption of an exogenous defined rental function. Instead, 
we allow the market rent to be endogenously and jointly defined in an inverse 
demand function and a cost function. Like Williams (1991) and Capozza and Li 
(1994), we also further extend the model by allowing the intensity of 
development to be variable. Unlike in Pindyck’s (1988) marginal approach, 
where capital investment is a continuous process embedded with a series of 
compound options, the optimal timing and optimal intensity are joint decisions 
in our model. They will have to be solved simultaneously when the 
development option is exercised.  
Our numerical results of the volatility effects are not inconsistent with those 
observed in the standard real option literature, which predicts a positive 
relationship between volatility of demand shocks and the trigger value and the 
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development option value. However, the effects of market demand factor, 
which is represented by the rental sensitivity variable, [b], shed new insight to 
the findings in optimal timing and intensity options in the literature. The results 
show that when rental sensitivity to the market demand is low, we would 
expect the development activities to slow down and also the scale of 
development, if undertaken, will likely be smaller. The deferment option value 
is not only dependent on the demand shock volatility; it is also negatively 
related to the rental sensitivity to the market demand. For a market that is 
insensitive to the changes in demand, we would expect the development 
activities to be depressed and the city growth to be slower. 
There are several extensions that can be made to the existing model framework 
proposed in the paper. Firstly, the cost function, which is assumed to be 
deterministic, can be assumed to follow a realistic stochastic process. Secondly, 
the monopolist scenario can be further extended to cover oligopolist market 
using a duopoly model like those proposed by Grenadier (1996 and 2001). In 
his duopoly real options papers, the output is again exogenously determined. 
This assumption could be relaxed by allowing the output to be endogenously 





Chapter 5 Optimal Timing of Real Estate Development 
under Symmetric Duopoly  
----- Grenadier’s Model 
 
In the two proceeding chapters, optimal timing models with only one developer 
have been evaluated. The simple one player model will be extended to include 
multi-developers in the market. This model is developed along the line of 
Grenadier (1996a). Although this chapter is meant to provide some 
fundamental concept, which will be future built on in the following two 
chapters.  
5.1 Introduction 
In the traditional real options literature, optimal exercising strategies can be 
derived without considering the strategic interactions. This is commonly the 
case in financial option because most financial options are held by agents 
external to the firms, and therefore their exercise does not influence the 
characteristics of the underlying security. However in the real estate investment, 
where there is more than one developer in the market, the exercise of the 
development option by one developer will have impact on the others’ decision. 
The traditional one developer real options theory is not appropriate for 
interactive strategies. In this chapter, a two-developer model in both real 
options and game theoretical framework will be explained. The sub-game 
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perfect Nash equilibrium option exercise strategies, which, as noted in 
Grenadier (1996a), will be derived to explain some real world anomalies.  
This chapter develops a simple oligopoly model, where only two developers in 
the market and the two developers are identical. The two developers face the 
same demand function and the same cost structures.  The results of the 
equilibrium strategies are symmetric. The symmetric sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium strategies will form the basic framework for extension for other 
asymmetric models in the subsequent chapters.  
5.2 Problem Specification and Model Assumptions 
The model is set up with only two real estate developers in the market, and 
both of them have an identical lot of land. The two developers plan to start a 
real estate development project in the future; the problem faced by them is 
when to start the development, in other words, they face the decision of when 
to exercise the development options.  
The two developers have the same inverse demand function, which has the 
following form: 
)(QYDR = .…………………………………………………………… (5.2.1) 
R is the rental flow from the finished project. Q is the aggregate supply of 
finished project in the market, which is the sum of  the quantity of  floor 
space in the two projects: 
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1 2Q q q= + …………………….……………………………………….. (5.2.2) 
Y is the real estate industry specific economic shock, which is assumed to have 
no correlation with the market risk1. The economic shock follows a geometric 
Brownian motion: 
dY Ydt Ydwµ σ= + ………………………………………………………. (5.2.3) 
(.)D  is a differentiable function with '(.) 0D < 2 
The basic assumptions in the option pricing theory hold for this symmetric 
duopoly model. The two developers are rational, who strives to achieve value 
maximizing objectives subject to the other’s strategies.  
In the equilibrium, one developer will start development first and become the 
leader. The second developer will start his project later and become the 
follower. There are also instances where the two developers may start the 
development simultaneously. If both developers try to start first, the assumption 
is that there is only one winner in the random fair game. The winning developer 
who starts the development first becomes the leader, while the other developer 
will be the follower. The strategic nature of the option exercise game is clear. 
When the leader exercises his development option, the leader pays a sunk 
cost I , and in return, the leader will receive a monopoly rental flow )1(YD after 
the project is completed and before the follower finishes his project. In the 
follower’s option, the follower will also pay the initial cost of I and receives 
                                                        
1 This justifies that I can use risk neutral valuation in valuing the development option. 
2 This insures that the demand is downward sloping.  
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rental flow of )2(YD at the end of construction. After the follower finishes his 
project the leader will no longer enjoy the monopoly rental flow and he can 
only receive duopoly rental flow of )2(YD , i.e. (1) (2)YD YD> .  
5.3 The Developers’ Value 
In this section, the value of the development options for the two competing 
developers both developers are developed, which can be solved in a backward 
deduction process. First the follower’s development option value is solved, and 
then followed by the option value for the leader.  
5.3.1 The Follower’s Value 
The follower’s development option value )(YVF is the function of the 
instantaneous economic shock Y . According to the Ito’s lemma, the 
instantaneous change of the follower’s option value has the form: 
dwYYVdtYYVYVYYdV FFFF )(')](')(''5.0[)(
22 σµσ ++= ……………. (5.3.1) 
With the risk-neutral assumption, the following ordinary differential equation 
holds: 
0)()(')(''5.0 22 =−+ YrVYYVYVY FFF µσ   ……………………….…. (5.3.2) 
Equation (5.3.2) can be solved subject to the following value matching and 
smooth pasting boundary conditions: 
0)0( =FV   ……………………………………………………….…… (5.3.3) 
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( )(2)( ) rF F




− −= −− …………………………………………..… (5.3.4) 





− −= − ……………………………………………..…... (5.3.5) 
(5.3.3) holds because 0=Y is the absorbing barrier of the geometric Brownian 
motion. FY is the trigger value of the follower’s development option.  
Solving (5.3.2) subject to the above boundary conditions gives the following 
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−−= − …………………………………………..… (5.3.7) 
is the trigger value.  
Proposition 5.1 (Summary of the Follower’s Strategy): 
Conditional on the fact that the leader has begun development, the optimal 
strategy for the follower is to begin development in the first moment when 
Y equals or exceeds the trigger value, FY , as defined in (5.3.7). The optimal 
timing for the follower to exercise the development option is given as: 
( )1
1








−−= ≥ ≥ − . 
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5.3.2 The Leader’s Value 
Based on the rational assumptions that the follower will rationally pursue the 
optimal follower strategy, the following ordinary differential equation can be 
derived to represent the value of the development option value for the leader:  
0)1(),(),('),(''5.0 )(22 =+−+ −− δµδδµδσ rLLL eYDYrVYYVYVY ………. (5.3.8) 
The boundary condition here is: 
0),0( =δLV ……………………………………………………………(5.3.9a) 
( )( )









= + −− − ………………... (5.3.9b) 
Solving (5.3.8) subject to (5.3.9) yields the following value equation: 
( ) (2) (1)1 1(1) ( )
1 (2)1( , )
( ) ( )
(1) [ (2) (1)]
L
re D D YYD I if Y YFr D YFV Y
r re YeYD D D if Y YFr r
µ δ β β
µ β
δ
µ δ µ τ
µ µ
− −⎧ −⎪ + <− −⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ − − − −⎪ + − ≥⎪ − −⎩
… (5.3.10) 
when the leader begins development, the leader receives a payoff of 
IYVL −),( τ and the follower receives )(YVF . Depending on the initial time of 
entry, the leader’s payoff may be greater of less than that of the follower. The 
following proposition describes the relative valuations: 
Proposition 5.2: There exists a unique point, ),0( FL YY ∈ , with the following 
properties:  
)(),( YVIYV FL <−τ  for LYY <  
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)(),( YVIYV FL =−τ  for LYY =  
)(),( YVIYV FL >−τ  for FL YYY <<  
)(),( YVIYV FL =−τ  for LYY ≥  
Proof: See Grenadier (1996) 
 
5.4 The Equilibrium Exercise Strategies 
Based on the values of leader and follower, the symmetric sub-game perfect 
equilibrium strategy for both developers can be solved holding on the 
assumption that who is the leader and who is the follower are endogenously 
determined. The equilibrium strategy depends on the initial economic shock, so 
the analysis will be carried out with different initial economic shock.  
5.4.1 LYY <0   
If the initial economic shock 0Y is lower than LY , then becoming a follower is 
optimal, because in this range of the economic shock, the payoff of the leader is 
less than that for a follower. Thus both developers wait until the economic 
shock reaches LY , at which both developers want to exercise the development 
option immediately because the payoff for the leader is more than that for the 
follower as soon as the economic shock exceeds LY . Here the winner of a 
random game will develop first, and become the leader. The other developer 
has to wait until the economic shock reaches FY  and becomes the follower. 
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5.4.2 FL YYY << 0  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, both developers want to 
develop immediately as the payoff for the leader is more than that for the 
follower in this range. Again the winner of a random game will exercise the 
development option first and become the leader. The other will wait until the 
economic shock reaches FY .  
5.4.3 FYY ≥0  
In this range, any equilibrium strategy will be characterized as simultaneous 
exercise. If one of the developers begins development when the economic 
shock exceeds FY , the other will also enter immediately. This is consistent with 
proposition 1, which says that the follower should exercise its development 
option in the first moment when the economic shock equals or exceeds FY . 
Thus in the Nash equilibrium, there will be finite number of equilibrium 
strategies over this range, all of which are simultaneous exercise. Here a very 
special equilibrium is obtained at this point, which is Pareto optimal and the 
social welfare is maximized.  
Let the value of each developer be )(XG , the Pareto optimal option value can 
be derived using the following ordinary differential equation: 
0)()(')(''5.0 22 =−+ YrGYYGYGY µσ ………………………………… (5.4.1) 
Boundary conditions are needed to solve ODE (5.4.1). The trigger value of 
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jointly exercising the option is denoted as JY . Thus, if the economic shock 
reaches JY , each developer will exercise its development option and their value 



















−− )2(1)( )( τµµ …………………………………….... (5.4.4) 
(5.4.2) is the value matching condition, (5.4.3) is the smooth pasting condition 
and (5.4.4) is the boundary condition that reflects the fact that each will begin 
development immediately when the economic shock falls to FY . 
























Where JYAA ,, 21 are solved numerically solved in the following system of 




































21 …………………………………….. (5.4.8) 




If the initial economic shock 0Y is less than FY , the equilibrium strategy 
involves sequential exercising of the development option, that is, one of the 
developer begins development, when the economic shock first reaches or 
exceeds LY , and becomes the leader. The second developer will wait until the 
economic shock reaches FY , and becomes the follower. 
If the initial economic shock 0Y is larger than FY , the equilibrium strategy is 
characterized by simultaneous exercising of the development option. If one 
developer exercises its development option, the other will exercise its own 
immediately.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces Grenadier’s (1996) symmetric duopoly model, which 
forms an important building block for extensions in subsequent chapters. 
In the duopoly model with symmetric developers and complete information, 
real estate development decision is analyzed in the framework of both real 
options and game theory. Based on the values for both the leader and the 
follower, which can be calculated by using the real options theory, the 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium strategies can be determined. The results 
show that the equilibrium strategies can be either sequential or simultaneous 
depending on the levels of the initial economic shocks.  
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As noted in Grenadier’s (1996) paper, the analysis of the option games can help 
to understand the real world situation such as development cascade and 
overbuilding in real estate market. This chapter uses the theoretical option 
game modeling to a general real estate development option problems. 
Empirical implications of the model are beyond the scope of this study. 
The derivations of the duopoly market model in this chapter provide an 
important foundation for more complex duopoly market which will be 
expanded in the next two chapters. The duopoly market where the two 
developers are asymmetric and the information is not complete will be one of 














Chapter 6 Optimal Timing of Real Estate Development 
under Asymmetric Duopoly  
6.1 Introduction  
In chapter 5, the model of symmetric duopoly developed by Grenadier (1996) 
is presented. In the real world, it is unlikely that the two identical developers 
are found especially in the real estate market, which is heterogeneous. The 
design, the structure, and the building material may be the same; the location 
factor may different effect on the real estate. In the real estate, the most 
important thing is: “Location, Location, Location”. It is thus not realistic to 
assume symmetric developers in the real estate market.  
 
In this chapter, a real options model in asymmetric duopoly framework will be 
explored. There are different ways of modeling asymmetric developers. One 
way is to assume that the developers have different cost function1; while 
another is to assume different inverse demand functions for different 
developers. Given the heterogeneous characteristic of real estate2, I assume that 
the two developers have different inverse demand functions, that the 
equilibrium prices for the different projects are different. One developer may be 
more advantageous than another and comparative advantage of the developers 
will also vary. The comparative advantage of developers will be explicitly 
                                                        
1 Pawlina and Kort (2001) 
2 Obviously the most important heterogeneous factor in real estate is location, different locations result in different 
price, thus different comparative advantage of the developers 
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defined and the equilibrium timing strategies will also be derived for different 
levels of comparative advantage.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 states some 
necessary assumptions and the model settings. Section 6.3 derives the option 
values for both developers. The equilibrium strategies for both developers will 
be given in section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Model Specification 
At a start we assume that there are two potential developers; each owns a piece 
of land for future development. Both developers have a development option of 
the vacant land. The two land parcels are heterogeneous and located in two 
different locations. The finished projects, as a result, are also heterogeneous, 
and the demand functions are not identical. The finished project will yield a 
rental flow according a downward sloping inverse demand function, which is 
subject to an industry specific economic shock.  
Assuming that the inverse demand function has the following form: 
( , ), 1, 2i iR D Y Q i= =                                          (6.2.1) 
where iR is the rental inflow of the finished project, Q is the total supply of the 
finished project, i.e. 21 qqQ += , where 0, 0i iD DY Q
∂ ∂> <∂ ∂ ; and Y is the 
industry-specific economic shock, which follows Geometric Brownian Motion: 
dwdt
Y
dY σµ +=                                              (6.2.2) 
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whereµ is the instantaneous expected change rate per unit time of the economic 
shock, dw is the increment of a standard wiener process. The economic shocks 
may come in various forms in the real world. For example, in the commercial 
real estate, the economic shock may be represented by uncertainty in the 
business profit; and in the residential real estate, the economic shock may be 
the job or income growth. These real world economic shocks are assumed to be 
exogenous to this model. 
In a heterogeneous real estate market, )(QDi is different for developer 2,1=i . 
For the simplicity in the model, the inverse demand function is assumed to 
follow the specific form: 
( ), 1, 2i iR YD Q iα= =                                          (6.2.3) 
Without loss of generality, we assume that developer 1 has comparative 
advantage over developer 2, i.e. 21 αα > . 1 2,α α are assumed to be deterministic 
and constant, in other words the comparative advantage is fixed over time and 
known to both developers. 
The investment cost is also assumed to be deterministic and constant over time, 
which is denoted by I . 
Unlike common investments, the exercise of a development option will not 
yield immediate cash inflow. It takes time to finish a project, the rental flows 
are generated only after the completion of the project. The “time to build” may 
be different for different types of projects and different scales. The time to build 
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in this model is assumed to be constant, denoted byτ . 
Unlike in the symmetric case, the asymmetric optimal development option 
model will have three possible outcomes rather than two. The first one is that 
the developer who has comparative advantage over the other will move first. 
The second one is that the less advantageous developer moves first. The third 
outcome is that the two move simultaneously. In the symmetric case, the first 
two outcomes are the same because the two developers cannot be 
differentiated. 
The strategic interaction is as follows. If developer i starts first, he pays an 
initial investment outlay of I .After the project is completed in τ  years time, 
he receives rental of (1)iYDα per unit time before the completion of the project 
by the other developer j . The exercise of the development option will affect the 
second developer in two ways: (i) It prevents the other developer from being 
the leader. (ii) It may also affect the timing of exercising the development 
option by the follower. The exercise of the follower’s option will also have 
impact on the leader’s payoff function. The follower j  pays the initial 
investment outlay of I  to start the development. Upon completion, the instant 
rental cash flow for the leader reduces to (2)iYDα rather than (1)iYDα .  
The equilibrium exercise strategies that are sub-game perfect, Markovian and 
asymmetric are derived in this chapter. The basic idea here is that at each stage 
the game is in Nash equilibrium in that conditional on the other developer’s 
behavior, each developer’s decision is optimal. Given different level of 
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comparative advantage and different initial economic shocks, the equilibrium 
strategies will be sequential, preemptive or simultaneous. In some cases there 
are more than one equilibriums or even infinite number of equilibriums. In such 
cases, we will examine special equilibriums that are Pareto optimal. 
6.3 The Option Values of the Leader and The follower 
In this model, one developer will developer first and becomes the leader, and 
the other will then become the follower. In this asymmetric model, there are 
three possible outcomes that will be adopted by of follower and leader. We will 
not differentiate the two developers in deriving the value, because the formula 
for both leader and the follower are only differentiated by the subscript the 
variables. 
Suppose that developer i is the follower and developer j  is the leader. The 
decision of developer j  will first be solved first, following backward 
induction procedure, and then followed by that of developer i . Let’s denote the 
follower’s option value as )(YV jF ; According to Ito’s Lemma the instantaneous 
change of )(YV jF before the exercise of the development option can be 
represented in the following form: 
dwYYVdtYYVYVYYdV jFjFjFjF )(')](')(''5.0[)(
22 σµσ ++=           (6.3.1) 
Let’s assume that the developers are risk neutral, thus the developer should earn 
a risk free rate of return, and the following ordinary differential equation is 
obtained: 
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0)()(')(''5.0 22 =−+ YrVYYVYVY jFjFjF µσ                        (6.3.2) 
The above equation has the general solution form as follows: 
21
21)(
ββ YBYBYV jF +=                                       (6.3.3) 
21 ,ββ  are the solutions to the following quadratic equation: 
2 2 21 1( ) 0
2 2












σσµσµβ r                  (6.3.5b) 
To solve the above differential equation, boundary conditions are defined. 
Given that 0=Y is an absorbing barrier of the geometric Brownian motion, 
thus 
0)0( =jFV                                                  (6.3.6) 
This implies that 02 =B . 
Following the theory of optimal stopping, there exists a trigger value jFY  at 
which it is optimal for the follower to exercise the development option, at 
time jFT , where jFjF YtYtT ≥≥= )(:0inf{ . At the trigger value, the value 
matching and smooth pasting conditions hold. Upon exercising the 
development option, the follower will receive cash flows of )2(DYjFjα , which 
begins in τ years, whereτ  is the time to build of the development. Thus the 
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Proposition 6. 1: the Optimal Follower’s Strategy 
If developer j  is the follower in the duopoly game of development, the 
optimal strategy for him is to begin development when the exogenous economic 
shock reaches the trigger value jFY . Mathematically the developer should begin 













−−= ≥ ≥ −  
 
The following corollary gives the results result on the optimal timing decision 
for the two developers. 
Corollary6. 1  
The trigger value of developer 1 as the follower is lower than that of developer 
2, i.e. developer 1 will begin development earlier than developer 2 if both are 
followers. 
The proof of the corollary is obvious; putting the simple argument here is 
because that the comparative timing is very important in determining the 
equilibrium strategy which will be discussed later on. 
Now consider the development option value of the leader. Suppose that the 
leader has already exercised its development option and will take δ years until 
completion, whereδ τ≤ . Following the same methodology as in the earlier 
case, the leader’s value ( , )iLV Y δ ，after the leader has exercised his development 
option, , satisfies the following ordinary differential equation: 
0)1(),(),('),(''5.0 )(22 =+−+ −− δµαδδµδσ riiLiLiL eYDYrVYYVYVY    (6.3.12) 
To solve this ordinary differential equation, we also need to define the 
boundary conditions. Considering the leader’s option value at jFY , at this point, 
where the leader and the follower exercise its development option, the optimal 
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value at that this point would be: 
( )( )
( , ) (1) [ (2) (1)]
rr
i jF
iL jF jF i
Y eeV Y Y D D D
r r
µ τµ δ αδ αµ µ
− −− −
= + −− −          (6.3.13a) 
0),0( =δiLV                                               (6.3.13b) 
Solve equation (6.3.12) subject to (6.3.13) gives: 




(1) [ (2) (1)]
iL
re D D YY D I if Y Yi jFr D YjF
V Y
rr Yee iY D D D if Y Yi jFr r
µ δ β βαµ β
δ
µ τµ δ ααµ µ
− −⎧ −⎪ + <− −⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ − −− −⎪ + − ≥⎪ − −⎩
(6.3.14) 
At the point when the leader begins construction, the leader’s value 
is ( , )iLV Y Iτ − .The following propositions state the comparison of the option 
value of being the follower and the leader respectively. 
Proposition 6. 2: For developer 1, there exists a unique 1 1(0, )L FY Y∈ , such that 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1 1 2
( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
L F L
L F L
L F L F
L F F
V Y I V Y if Y Y
V Y I V Y if Y Y
V Y I V Y if Y Y Y







− > < <
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Define 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( )L FF Y V Y I V Yτ= − − . 
Then Note that  
1(0) 0F I= − <                                              (6.3.16) 
with some necessary manipulation, we obtain  
1 1( ) 0FF Y >                                                 (6.3.17) 
So there is at least one root in 1(0, )FY . 
Examine the second order derivative gives: 
1 ''( ) 0F Y <                                                 (6.3.18) 
Thus the root is unique. 











For every fixed 2α there exists a threshold *1α , such that  
(i) if *1 1 2α α α> > ,  
2 2( , ) ( )L FV Y I V Yτ − <  for all 2FY Y< .  
(ii) if *1 1 2α α α> > , there exist 2 2 1, (0, )a bL L FY Y Y∈ , such that  
2 2 2
2 1 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
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− > < <
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− < < <
− = ≥
                    (6.3.19) 
Proof: 
Note that 2 ( , )LV Y Iτ − is a decreasing unbounded function of 1α , while 
2 ( )FV Y is independent of 1α and bounded, Thus there must be a unique *1α , for 
every fixed 2α , such that if *1 1α α≥ ,  
2 2( , ) ( )L FV Y I V Yτ − <  for all 2FY Y< .                           (6.3.20) 
By a simple manipulation: 2 2 2( , ) ( )L F FV Y I V Y if Y Yτ − = ≥  
Define 2 1 2 1 2 1( , ) ( , , ) ( , )L FF Y V Y I V Yα τ α α= − −                    (6.3.21) 
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2 1 1( , ) 0FF Y α = , and 2 1 1( , ) 0FF YY
α∂ <∂                            (6.3.22) 
With that 2 1(0, ) 0F Iα = − <                                   (6.3.23) 
Then there exists a root for 2 1( , )F Y α , if 1 2α α= .  
So we can conclude that: *1 2α α>  
 
For *1 1 2α α α> > , we know that there must be at least one root for 2 1( , )F Y α , 
denoted as 2
a
LY , and at the point 2
a
LY Y ε= + , 2 1( , ) 0F Y α > . We can also find 
that 2 1 1( , ) 0FF Y α < . Thus there must be another root for 2 1( , )F Y α in 2 1( , )aL FY Y  
And the concavity of 2 1( , )F Y α ensures that the two roots are the only roots 
for 2 1( , )F Y α .  










Figure 6-2 Developer 2’s Value When *1 1 2α α α> >  
 90
 
The following corollary states explicitly the relationship of various trigger 
values 
Corollary 6.2: For *2 1 1α α α< < , 1 2 2 1 2a bL L L F FY Y Y Y Y< < < <            
(6.3.24) 
Proof: The proof can be achieved by compute the function values at the trigger 
values.  
 
For later conveniences, we define the following concept.  
Definition 1: We say developer 1 has greater comparative advantage over 
developer 2 if *1 1 2α α α> >  
Definition 2: We say that developer 1 has smaller comparative advantage over 








Economic Shock*1 1 2α α α> >Figure 6-3 Developer 2’s Value When  
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6.4 The Equilibrium Exercise Strategies 
In this section we will examine the equilibrium exercise strategies. For this 
dynamic game model, sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for the two 
asymmetric developers are developed. The equilibrium exercising strategies are 
dependent on the comparative characteristics of the developers and the initial 
state of the economy, as represented byY . As shown in the last section, 
different comparative advantage may lead to different trigger values, and 
consequently different equilibrium strategies.  
6.4.1. Equilibrium Strategy when *1 1[ , )α α∈ +∞  
This case represents a situation in which developer 1 has great comparative 
advantage over developer 2, which implies the level of asymmetry is high. In 
this case developer 2 cannot exert any preemptive competition against 
developer 1, because the value of developer 2 as a follower is not lower the 
value of being a leader. So in this case, there would not be a preemptive entry, 
developer 1 has the monopoly power. The equilibrium strategy also depends on 
the initial economic shock 0Y , which can defined by different ranges of 0Y . 
(i) 0 2(0, )FY Y∈  
If the game begins with an initial value of the exogenous economic shock that 
is lower than 2FY , we will see a sequential equilibrium. Developer 1 begins 
development first. Developer 2 will begin development when Y first reaches 
2FY .We still need to specify the optimal timing for developer 1, which is again 
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an optimal stopping problem. Let 1( )V Y denote the value of developer 1 before 
the start of development, 1( )V Y satisfies the following ordinary differential 
equation: 
2 2
1 1 10.5 ''( ) '( ) ( ) 0Y V Y YV Y rV Yσ µ+ − =                            (6.4.1) 
According to the optimal stopping theory, there exists a 1Y , such that it is 
optimal for developer 1 to begin development when Y  first reaches 1Y  , in 
other words developer 1 will begin development at time 1 1inf{ 0, }tT t Y Y= ≥ ≥  
The boundary conditions are 
1 1 1 1( ) ( , )LV Y V Y Iτ= −                                          (6.4.2) 
1 1 1 1'( ) '( , )LV Y V Y τ=                                            (6.4.3) 
In the traditional optimal stopping time problem, (6.4.2) is the value matching 
condition and (6.4.3) is the smooth pasting condition. Solving (6.4.1) subject to 










−−= −                                    (6.4.4) 
(iii) 0 2( , )FY Y∈ +∞  
In this range of 0Y , any equilibrium is characterized by simultaneous exercise of 
the option. If any of the developer begins development at 2FY Y> , then the 
other will enter immediately, which is supported by proposition 6.1 and 
corollary 6.1.  
Thus in this range there will be an infinite number of sub-game perfect 
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equilibrium strategies. Three special strategies will be examined here. These 
three strategies are Pareto dominant but Pareto incomparable. The first one is 
the maximization of the option value of developer 1; the second is the 
maximization of the option value of developer 2, and the last one is the 
maximization of the collusive value of developer 1 and developer 2. In the first 
two cases, the games are still non-coordinate games, while in the third case the 
game is a coordinative game, i.e. the collusive strategy. As the derivations of 
the first two cases are the same, they will be put together below. 
(a) Maximization of developer i’s value 
Denote the value of developer i  as ( )iG Y in this part, using the Ito’s Lemma 
and risk neutral assumption, ( )iG Y will satisfy the following ordinary 
differential equation: 
2 20.5 ''( ) '( ) ( ) 0i i iY G Y YG Y rG Yσ µ+ − =                           (6.4.5) 
The above is another optimal stopping problem. There exists a trigger value iPY , 
such that developer i  will exercise the development option when Y first 
reaches iPY . Developer i ’s option value will be maximized, and then the other 
developer will follow by exercising the development option immediately. Thus 
we have the value-matching and smooth pasting conditions as follows: 
( )(2)( ) rii iP iP




− −= −−                                   (6.4.6) 





− −= −                                       (6.4.7) 
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The third boundary condition is that developer i  will exercise the 
development option immediately when Y reaches 2FY . The third boundary 
condition is given as follows: 
( )
2 2
(2)( ) rii F F




− −= −−                                  (6.4.8)  
The general solution to the ordinal differential equation (6.4.5) is: 
1 2
1 2( )iG Y B Y B Y
β β= +                                         (6.4.9) 
1 2,β β  are the same as (6.3.5). 1 2,B B  and 1PY can be solved numerically from 
the following systems of nonlinear equations: 
( )1 2
1 2
1 1 ( )1 2
1 1 2 2
(2) ( )1 2
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                   (6.4.10) 
(b) Maximization of the collusive value of developer 1 and developer 2 
Denoting the sum of developer 1 and developer’s value as ( )G Y , which satisfies 
the following ODE: 
2 20.5 ''( ) '( ) ( ) 0Y G Y YG Y rG Yσ µ+ − =                          (6.4.11) 
The boundary conditions for the ordinary differential equation are: 
( )1 2( ) (2)( ) rP P




− −+= −−                            (6.4.12) 
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− −+= −                                 (6.4.13) 
( )1 2
2 2
( ) (2)( ) rF F




− −+= −−                            (6.4.14) 
The general solution to (6.4.12) is the same as (6.4.10), but 1 2,B B  and PY  
must be solved by different system of equations: 
( )1 21 2
1 2
1 1 ( )1 21 2
1 1 2 2
1 2( (2) ( )1 2
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⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
             (6.4.15) 
6.4.2 Equilibrium strategy when *1 2 1( , )α α α∈  
When 1α falls within the range of *2 1( , )α α , the trigger values satisfy 
1 2 2 1 2
a b
L L L F FY Y Y Y Y< < < <  as in corollary 2.  When the initial value of the 
economic shock 0Y is different relative to the trigger values, different 
equilibrium strategies will be derived.   
(i) 0 2(0, )
a
LY Y∈  
If the initial economic shock is in the 2(0, )
a
LY range, developer 1 does not face 
any preemptive risk by developer 2. Thus developer 1 is free to choose the 
optimal development timing without the fear the competition from developer 2. 
The trigger value of developer 1 is 1Y  as depicted in (6.4.4). Developer 2 will 
wait until the economic shock reaches 2FY . 
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(ii) 0 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈  
Over this range, both developers want to build immediately. Then the random 
winner of the competition will develop first. If developer1 wins, then developer 
1 will build immediately, developer 2 will wait until 2FY ; conversely if 
developer 2 wins, then developer 2 begins development immediately and 
developer 1 will wait until 1FY . 
(iii) 0 2 2( , )
b
L FY Y Y∈  
In this region, developer 1 faces no preemptive competition from developer 2, 
because it is optimal for developer 2 to be a follower. Developer 1 can choose 
the optimal timing of development, if the initial economic shock is in this range, 
and then developer 2 will begin development at 2FY . It is again an optimal 
stopping time for developer 1 in choosing the optimal development timing. Let 
1( )M Y denote the value of developer 1 here, and 1( )M Y satisfies  
2 2
1 1 10.5 ''( ) '( ) ( ) 0Y M Y YM Y rM Yσ µ+ − =                         (6.4.16) 
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'( ) '( , )
M M
M M
M Y V Y I




=                                        (6.4.17) 
The additional condition is that when Y drops to 2
b
LY , developer 1 starts 
development immediately, which is given as 
1 2 1 2( ) ( , )
b b
L LM Y V Y Iτ= −                                       (6.4.18) 
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Then MY can be solved numerically from (6.4.16), (6.4.17) and (6.4.18). 
(iv) 0 2( , )FY Y∈ +∞  
In this case, the situation is the same as discussed in (iii) in the last subsection.  
We see from the above analysis that in the case where developer 1 has greater 
comparative advantage over developer 2, the timing of developer 1 is generally 
later than that in smaller comparative advantage case. This is because that in 
the first case, developer 1 faces less competition, or precisely preemption from 
developer 2, developer 2’s strength is too weak as represented by relatively 
smallerα . 
Section VI: Conclusion  
In the real world of real estate development, developers are not identical for 
various reasons. There will be some developers, who are comparatively 
advantageous, and others who are less advantageous. Thus our model is 
realistic to capture the different characteristics of developers, compared to the 
symmetric cases. The model is, however, more complicated technically.  
Asymmetry in the developers’ characteristics has considerable implications for 
the value of waiting to invest, and the equilibrium strategies. We can see from 
the models that different levels of asymmetry lead to different equilibrium 
strategies and the option values for both developers are also different. While in 
some cases, the equilibriums are the same as those obtained in the symmetric 
cases; they are different in most cases. Asymmetry allows the comparatively 
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advantage for developer to be strictly binding in determining the optimal timing 
of development. In some cases the comparatively advantageous developer can 
have monopoly power, in the sense that he can ignore the preemptive 
competition from the other developer. This situation cannot be observed in 
symmetric cases.  
The asymmetric duopoly model is more realistic, and it also has more 
explanatory power of the real world problems. However empirical tests of the 
theoretical model are difficult to be implemented at this stage. Difficulty in 
measuring and quantifying the comparative strength of the developers is one of 
the main obstacles in carrying out empirical tests of the theoretical analysis of 













Chapter 7 Real Estate Development under Incomplete 
Information 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we model real estate development options in complete 
information world, in which the developers know exactly the payoff upon 
exercising its own development options, because they know both the market 
structure and the characteristics of the other developer.  
But in the real world, agents generally do not have complete information about 
the rivals’ strength. The information that is not revealed to the public, which is 
called private information, will significantly alter the way the game is played. 
In the framework of an incomplete information timing game, the important 
thing is how the developers determine their strategies when they face both 
uncertain market conditions, incomplete information. 
In the real estate market, as noted by Grenadier (1999), information that is 
private to specific market participants is prevailed. For example, local 
developers may have particular knowledge of the suitability of particular 
location, and larger developer may have expertise on market-wide factors and 
trends.   
Like in Grenadier (1999), the information in our model is conveyed through the 
revealed option exercise strategies of the market participants. This is consistent 
with the approach adopted in the mainstream literature, which assumes that the 
 100
information transmission is accomplished only through actions. The actual 
actions taken by the developers are considered to be credible signals and 
information. Other forms of information transmission may not be credible. 
Sometimes agents attempt to mislead his rivals in using other forms of 
information revelation.  
The model presented in this chapter differs from Grenadier (1999) in the 
following aspects:  
(1) The parameters of private information contain explicit meaning, while in 
Grenadier they are only collectively regarded as be a private signal 
(2) The option payoff is endogenously determined by the market demand and 
supply. While in Grenadier (1999), the payoff is assume to be exogenous 
regardless of different level of market supply, which may be restrictive. 
 
The incomplete information model proposed in this chapter is developed on the 
basis of the framework of the complete information models presented in the 
previous chapter. The equilibrium strategies will be derived based on the results 
obtained in the complete information model, either in a symmetric or an 
asymmetric duopoly.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 specifies the model 
settings and necessary assumptions. Section 7.3 derives the Markov, sub-game 
perfect, Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in different scenarios. Section 7.4 
analyzes the welfare loss due to incomplete information. Section 7.5 concludes 
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the chapter.  
7.2 Model Specification 
At the start, there are two potential developers; each owns a piece of vacant 
land with future development potential. Both developers have an option to 
decide the optimal timing of development. These two parcels of land are 
heterogeneous; as a result, the finished projects are also heterogeneous. The 
finished project yields rental flows that follow a downward sloping inverse 
demand function. The demand function is subject to an industry specific 
economic shock. Based on the heterogeneity in the finished projects, the 
demand functions are different for the two developers. 
Assuming that the inverse demand function has the following form: 
( , ), 1, 2i iR D Y Q i= =                                          (7.2.1) 
where iR is the rental inflow of the finished project, Q is the total supply of the 
finished project, such that 0, 0i iD D
Y Q
∂ ∂> <∂ ∂ . Y is the industry-specific 
economic shock, which evolves in a Geometric Brownian motion: 
dwdt
Y
dY σµ +=                                              (7.2.2) 
whereµ is the instantaneous expected change rate per unit time of the economic 
shock, dw is the increment of standard wiener process. The economic shocks 
are assumed to be exogenous in this model. 
The information on the demand function is not complete by using the following 
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form: 
( ), 1, 2i iR YD Q iα= =                                          (7.2.3) 
Where ( )D Q is common knowledge to both developers, and ( )YD Q can be 
interpreted as the inverse demand function for a typical property, While iα is 
private information of developer i , where for normalization purpose: 
i iα θε=                                                    (7.2.4) 








ξ ξε ξξ ξ
⎧ =⎪ +⎪= ⎨⎪ =⎪ +⎩
                                   (7.2.5) 
Without loss of generality, we assume 1ξ > . 
The investment cost, which is also assumed to be deterministic and constant 
over time, is denoted by I . 
Thus in the world with incomplete information, one developer will exercise his 
own development option based on his rational expectation of the other 
developer. And the expectation changes over time when one developer observes 
the other’s action, action here means exercising the development option or not 
exercising the development option. As iα has a discrete distribution, the 
adjustment to the expectation occurs only at certain critical times rather than 
continuously. 
In the incomplete information cases, there are more scenarios to be evaluated: 
(i) both developers withα θξ= , (ii) both developers with /α θ ξ=  and (iii) 
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one developer with α θξ=  the other developer with /α θ ξ= . The first two 
scenarios are the same as in the duopoly game in complete information, but it is 
not the case for incomplete information, because the decision is made based on 
the rational expectation of the other developer’s α . Thus the games in 
asymmetric duopoly developed in chapter 6 forms the foundation of the models 
to be developed in this chapter.  
7.3 Equilibrium Strategies under Incomplete Information 
As showed in proposition 6.3, there is a threshold of the comparative advantage, 
crossing which the strategies will change significantly. Thus in this incomplete 
information game, the range of comparative advantage parameters still plays an 
important role in determining the equilibrium strategies. Proposition 7.1, which 
can be viewed as a corollary to proposition 6.3, is needed in further discussion 
of the incomplete information game model.  
Proposition 7.1: There exists a unique *ξ , such that if *ξ ξ> , the developer 
with α θξ= has greater comparative advantage over the developer withα θ= , 
and the developer with α θ=  has greater comparative advantage over the 
developer with /α θ ξ=  
Proof:  
Set 1 2,α θξ α θ= = , then following Proposition 6.3 there exists a 1ξ , such that if 1ξ ξ> , 
then the developer with 1α θξ=  has greater comparative advantage over the developer 
with 2α θ= . And also there will be a 2ξ , such that if 2ξ ξ> , then the developer with 
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1α θ=  has greater comparative advantage over the developer with 2 /α θ ξ= . We 
choose 1 2* max( , )ξ ξ ξ=  satisfying the condition. Q.E.D 
Proposition 7.2 : There exists a unique **ξ , such that if **ξ ξ< , the developer 
with α θξ= has smaller comparative advantage over the developer withα θ= , 
and the developer with α θ=  has smaller comparative advantage over the 
developer with /α θ ξ=  
Proof:  
Set 1 2,α θξ α θ= = , then following Proposition 6.3 if 1ξ ξ< , then the developer with 
1α θξ=  has smaller comparative advantage over the developer with 2α θ= . And 
if 2ξ ξ< , then the developer with 1α θ=  has greater comparative advantage over the 
developer with 2 /α θ ξ= . We choose 1 2** min( , )ξ ξ ξ=  satisfying the condition.                 
Q.E.D 
Corollary 6.1: * **ξ ξ≥  
Proof:  
From proposition 6.1 and Proposition 6.2, we have 1 2 1 2max( , ) min( , )ξ ξ ξ ξ≥ . Q.E.D 
 
As the equilibrium strategies can be very different across the thresholds 
indicated in proposition 7.1, the following analyses of the equilibrium 
strategies will be divided into two parts according to the levels ofξ . 
 
Next we solve for the equilibrium strategies only in the region 
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*ξ ξ> and **ξ ξ< , because the equilibrium strategies in the region of 
* **ξ ξ ξ> > are inconclusive and not robust. For the convenience of 
discussion, we divided our analysis to some subsections.  
 
Scenario 1: *ξ ξ>  
While in this scenario, there are also four possible actual outcomes regarding 
different types of the two developers, namely (i) 1 2,α θξ α θξ= =  (ii) 
1 2, /α θξ α θ ξ= =  (iii) 1 2/ ,α θ ξ α θξ= = (iv) 1 2/ , /α θ ξ α θ ξ= =  . Without 
ex ante differentiate developer 1 and developer 2, (ii) and (ii) are the same, thus 
we only analyze (i), (ii) and (iv) 
(i) 1 2,α θξ α θξ= =  
Consider first developer 1’s strategy. Based on his rational expectation, 
developer 1 acts as if he has greater comparative advantage over developer 2, 
whose expected parameter is 2α θ= . While form the perspective of developer 2, 
he also consider himself as the comparatively advantageous one. Then there 
must be competitions in the equilibrium strategies.  




(0, ( )( ) )





−−∈ −  
If the initial economic shock falls is in this range, developer 1 will exercise his 
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− . Mathematically, developer 1 will exercise its 
investment option at the time ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − .  
Next, we consider the strategy of developer 2, based on developer 2’s 
expectation; it also wants to exercise its investment option 
at ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . Adopting the same approach 
used by Grenadier (1996). Suppose there is a random game, the winner of the 
game will invest at time ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − , while 
the loser in the game will invest 
at ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ −   
(2) ( )10
1
(( )( ) , )





−−∈ +∞−  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, then the equilibrium strategies 
are characterized by simultaneous exercise of the investment option. There are 
again infinite numbers of equilibrium strategies, and we can also find some 
Pareto optimal strategies in the line of the formulation in (6.4.5), (6.4.6), (6.4.7) 
and (6.4.8).  
(ii) 1 2, /α θξ α θ ξ= =  
In this case, developer 1 still consider himself as if he has greater comparative 
advantage over developer 2, while developer 2 consider itself always as a 
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disadvantageous one. The equilibrium strategies, however, still depend on the 
initial economic shock. 
(1) ( )10
1
(0, ( )( ) )





−−∈ −  
In this case, developer 1 will invest at the 
time ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − , this makes the true 
parameter of developer 1 to developer 2. Developer 2 waits until 
( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ −  
(2) ( ) ( )1 10
1 1
(( )( ) , ( )( ) )
1 ( ) (1) 1 ( / ) (2)
r rr rY e I e I
D D
µ τ µ τβ βµ µ
β θξ β θ ξ
− −− −∈ − −  
In this range, as developer 2 always wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − , developer 1, which 
anticipates that developer 2 will invest at 
time ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − , will invest immediately. 
While the exercise of developer 1’s option reveal the true parameter of 
developer 1 to developer 2. 
(3) ( )10
1
(( )( ) , )





−−∈ +∞−  
The equilibrium strategies in this range are again characterized by simultaneous 
exercise of the investment option. If one developer invests first, the other will 
invest immediately 
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(iii) 1 2/ , /α θ ξ α θ ξ= =  
In this case, both developers consider themselves as less advantageous one, and 
the equilibrium strategies leads to sufficient delay in the investment actions 
compared with complete information cases.  
(1) ( )10
1
(0, ( )( ) )





−−∈ −  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, then each developer will wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . Both developer will 
observe that the other developer do not invest at that time, then both developer 
will know the private information of each other, in this case, this game becomes 
a complete information symmetric option games as described in Grenadier 
(1996). But there are still some important differences. In Grenadier (1996), one 
of the developers will enter the market at LY , but in this article, there does exists 










− and LY  is not 
clear-cut. If ( )1
1
( )( )







−−≥ − , then the situation is the same with 
Grenadier (1996), one of the developers will exercise the investment option at 
{ 0 : }LT t Y Y= ≥ ≥ ; while if ( )1
1
( )( )







−−< − , then one of the 
developer will exercise its investment at 
( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . In both situations, the other 
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developer will wait until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ < − .In the 
first situation, the incomplete information will not cause any welfare loss since 
the timing is the same as in complete information, while in the second situation, 
one of the developer will miss the optimal timing thus induces welfare loss. In 
conclusion, in this scenario, one of the developers (the winner of a random 
game) will exercise its investment option 
at ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : min{ , ( )( ) }}
1 ( ) (1)
r
L




−−= ≥ ≥ − , and the other will 
wait until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ < − . 
(2) ( )10
1
(( )( ) , )





−−∈ ∞− .  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, the number of the equilibrium 
strategies, as in complete information, is infinite. Any one developer’s exercise 
of the investment will cause the other’s exercise immediately. Thus for 
whatever equilibrium that results, there will be simultaneous exercise strategy.  
Scenario 2 **ξ ξ<  
In this scenario, neither developer will consider himself as the one who has 
greater comparative advantage in all cases, and at most will consider himself as 
the one who has smaller advantage. To discuss the equilibrium strategies, again 
we need to expand Lemma 3 further to fit the situation here. First of all, some 
new notations: 
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We denote the threshold as depict in Lemma 3 for 1 2,α θε α θ= =  as 1 12 2,a bL LY Y , 
while those for 1 2, /α θ α θ ε= =  as 2 22 2,a bL LY Y . The following corollary says 
about the comparisons of these thresholds. 
Corollary 2: 2 1 2 12 2 2 2
a a b b
L L L LY Y Y Y< < < . 
Proof:  
Define 12 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )L FF Y V Y I V Yθξ θξ θξ= − − for the case where 
1 2,α θε α θ= = and  
2
2 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )L FF Y V Y I V Yθ θ θ= − − for the case where 1 2, /α θ α θ ξ= = . And 
we should have 1 12 2( , ) 0
a
LF Y θξ =  and 1 12 2( , ) 0bLF Y θξ = , and 2 22 2( , ) 0aLF Y θ =  
and 2 22 2( , ) 0
b
LF Y θ =  
A complicated calculation yields that 1 22 2( , ) 0
a
LF Y θξ <  and 1 22 2( , ) 0bLF Y θξ > . 
This gives the results.  
(i) 1α θξ= , 2 /α θ ξ=  
Based on developer 1’s rational expectation, his strategy will be the same as in 
the situation where 1α θξ=  and 2α θ= .Then the equilibrium strategies of 
both developers will be discussed in every range partitioned by the four 
thresholds as in Corollary 2. 
(1) 20 2(0, )
a
LY Y∈  
In this range, based on his rational expectation, developer 1 anticipates no 
preemptive competition from developer 2, and developer 2 also has no 
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incentive to preempt developer 1. Thus developer 1 will exercise its investment 
option at ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . Developer 2 will wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . In this situation, the 
equilibrium strategy is the same with the situation in complete information, 
thus incomplete information does not cause welfare loss in this situation.  
(2) 2 10 2 2( , )
a a
L LY Y Y∈  
In this range, based on his rational expectation, developer 1 still anticipates no 
preemptive competition from developer 2, thus he wants to exercise its 
investment option at time ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . But 
in this range, developer 2 has the incentive to preempt developer 1 by exercise 
his investment option immediately. Thus if ( )10
1
( )( )





−−< − , then 
the equilibrium strategy is: developer 2 exercise his investment option 
immediately and developer 1 wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)














−−> − , then both developers wants to invest 
immediately, thus the winner of a random game will invest first, the other will 
have to wait until ( )1
1








−−= ≥ ≥ − , for 
1 2i or= . 
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(3) 1 20 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈  
In this range, the equilibrium strategy is clear; both developers want to invest 
immediately. Thus the equilibrium strategy is: the winner of a random game 
will invest immediately, the other developer will have to wait 
until ( )1
1








−−= ≥ ≥ − , for 1 2i or= . 
(4) 2 10 2 2( , )
b b
L LY Y Y∈  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, then, based on his rational 
expectation, developer 1 will exercise his investment option immediately, while 
developer 2 will wait until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . In 
this case, the private information is not revealed until the game finishes, and the 
timing of developer 1 is not optimal compared with the case in complete 
information. Thus there is welfare loss due to incomplete information.  
(5) 1 ( )10 2
1
( , ( )( ) )
1 ( / ) (2)
b r
L




−−∈ −  
In this range, developer 1 anticipates no preemptive competition and developer 
2 has no incentive to preempt developer 1, thus developer 1 can choose the 
optimal timing of its own regardless of the private information of developer 2. 
The trigger value of developer 1 is thus given by the following system of 
equations: 
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( ) ( )1
'( ) '( )1
1 1( ) ( )12 2
M Y V Y IM M
M Y V YM M






Although the system equation has no analytical solution, it can be solved 
numerically. And the equilibrium strategy, thus, is: Developer 1 exercises his 
investment option at time inf{ 0 : ( ) }MT t Y t Y= ≥ ≥ . And developer 2 will have 
to wait until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − .  
(6) ( )10
1
(( )( ) , )





−−∈ +∞−  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, the equilibrium strategy is 
exactly the same as in complete information. There are infinite Nash 
equilibrium strategies characterized by simultaneous exercise of the investment 
option.  
(ii) 1α θξ= , 2α θξ=  
In this scenario, although under complete information, it is a symmetric 
duopoly game, the equilibrium strategy is still based on asymmetric duopoly 
game under incomplete information, but the equilibrium strategy, without 
surprise, should still be symmetric.  
Based on either developer’s rational expectation, the strategy is the same as 
,i jα θξ α θ= = . Thus the thresholds those are essential for both developers’ 
strategy is 1 12 2,
a b
L LY Y . 
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(1) 10 2(0, )
a
LY Y∈  
In this range, based on their own rational expectation, both developers 
anticipate no preemptive competition from the other developer, thus both 
developers want to exercise its investment option at 
( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . Thus the winner of a random 
game will exercise its developer option 
at ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ − , and his true while the other 
developer will have to wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . 
(2) 1 10 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, then both developers wants to 
exercise their investment option immediately to preempt the other developer. 
Thus the pure strategy Nash equilibrium would be: the winner of a random 
game will invest immediately, while the other developer will have to wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . 
(3) 1 ( )10 2
1
( , ( )( ) )
1 ( ) (2)
b r
L




−−∈ −  
In this range, both developers will anticipate no preemptive competition from 
the other, thus they will choose their own optimal timing regardless of the other 
developer’s private information. The trigger value of both developers is given 
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by  
( ) ( )1
'( ) '( )1
1 1( ) ( )12 2
M Y V Y IM M
M Y V YM M






as in the first scenario. But as both developers want to invest 
at inf{ 0 : ( ) }MT t Y t Y= ≥ ≥ , the equilibrium strategy would be: the winner of a 
random game will start investment at inf{ 0 : ( ) }MT t Y t Y= ≥ ≥ , and the other 
will have to wait until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . 
(4) ( )10
1
(( )( ) , )





−−∈ +∞−  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, the equilibrium strategy is 
exactly the same as in complete information. There are infinite Nash 
equilibrium strategies characterized by simultaneous exercise of the investment 
option.  
(iii) 1 /α θ ξ= , 2 /α θ ξ=  
In this scenario, the basic asymmetric duopoly game underlying the equilibrium 
strategy is / ,i jα θ ξ α θ= = . And the thresholds those are essential for the 
equilibrium strategy in this setting is 2 22 2,
a b
L LY Y .  
(1) 20 2(0, )
a
LY Y∈  
I f the initial economic shock falls in this range, and then both developers want 




( ) ( )( )
1 ( ) (1)




−−= − . At this point, both developers can observe 
that the other developer does not start investment, then the information 
concerning the other developer will be updated, both developers now know the 
exact information of the other. Then the game becomes a complete information 
symmetric duopoly game. Then the equilibrium strategy, as discussed before, is: 
the winner of a random game will start investment 
at ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : min{ , ( )( ) }}
1 ( ) (1)
r
L




−−= ≥ ≥ − , and the other 
developer will have to wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − .  
(2) 2 20 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈  
In this case, both developers want to invest immediately to preempt the other 
developer based on their own rational expectation. Thus the equilibrium 
strategy is: the winner of a random game will invest immediately, while the 
other will wait until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . 
(3) 2 ( )10 2
1
( , ( )( ) )
1 ( / ) (2)
b r
L




−−∈ −  
In this range, both developers want to be follower based on their rational 
expectation, until at the time inf{ 0 : ( ) }NT t Y t Y= ≥ ≥ . Where NY is given by  
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( ) ( )1
'( ) '( )1
2 2( ) ( )12 2
M Y V Y IN N
M Y V YN N






At that point of time, both developers will know the exact information of the 
other developer; the game becomes complete information symmetric duopoly 
game. The equilibrium strategy is: the winner of a random game will star 
investment at inf{ 0 : ( ) }NT t Y t Y= ≥ ≥ , while the other will wait 
until ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−−= ≥ ≥ − . 
(4) ( )10
1
(( )( ) , )





−−∈ +∞−  
If the initial economic shock falls in this range, the equilibrium strategy is 
exactly the same as in complete information. There are infinite Nash 
equilibrium strategies characterized by simultaneous exercise of the investment 
option.  
All the strategies discussed above is listed in table 6.1-6.6.   
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, pure theoretical models of duopoly real options games under 
incomplete information are proposed with the assumption that in the real world 
the information is n incomplete.  
Although the models with incomplete information assumption are more 
complicated than the complete information cases, systematic and tractable 
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methods are adopted to derive the equilibrium strategies under various 
scenarios.  
The limitation of this chapter is that although incomplete information is more 
common in real life, the explicit action under incomplete information is 
difficult to observe. Empirical verification of the propositions in this chapter 


















Appendix: Tables for Equilibrium Strategies: 
Table 7.1 Equilibrium Strategies ( *ξ ξ> , 1 2,α θξ α θξ= = ) 







(0, ( )( ) )







The winner of a random game 




inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( )
1 ( ) (1)




−−= ≥ ≥ −




inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( )
1 ( ) (2)










exactly his true 
parameter, but 
this does not 






(( )( ) , )







If one developer develops 










Table 7.2 Equilibrium Strategies ( *ξ ξ> , 1 2, /α θξ α θ ξ= = ) 
Table 7.3 Equilibrium Strategies ( *ξ ξ> , 1 2/ , /α θ ξ α θ ξ= = ) 
Initial Economic 
Shock 







(0, ( )( ) )







One developer starts development at  
1
1
inf{ 0 : min{ , ( )( ) }}
1 ( ) (1)L




−= ≥ ≥ −
, 
and the other wait until 
1
1
inf{ 0 : ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)




−= ≥ < −
 
Both developers will 
know exactly the 












If one developer develops first, then the 
other starts development 
immediately 









(0, ( )( )









inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)
r












inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)
r










2 knows 1’s true 
parameter after 1 






(( )( ) ,
1 ( ) (1)
( )( ) )























inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)
r























If one developer starts first then the other 
will start immediately 
No information is 
transmitted 
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LY Y∈  ( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)
r













inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)
r










Developer 2 knows 
developer 1’s parameter 
after developer 1’s exercise 
2 1
0 2 2( , )
a a




inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)
r












The first developer 2’s 
parameter is revealed to the 
developer 1 
1 2
0 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈
 
One developer develops immediately, 
ant the other wait until 
( )1
1








−−= ≥ ≥ −
 
The first developer’s 
parameter is revealed to the 
second one 
2 1
0 2 2( , )
b b






inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)
r




































inf{ 0 : ( )
( )( )
1 ( / ) (2)
r










Developer 1’s parameter is 












If one starts development, the other 
starts immediately 















LY Y∈  One developer develops at 
( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (1)










inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)









revealed to the 
second  
1 1
0 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈  One Developer develops at 
inf{ 0 : ( ) }MT t Y t Y= ≥ ≥ , the other, 
( )1
1
inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)














( , ( )( )









One Developer develops 




inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( ) (2)














(( )( ) ,







If one developer develops first, then 














LY Y∈  One developer at 
( )1
1
inf{ 0 : min{ , ( )( ) }}
1 ( ) (1)
r
L









inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)








revealed to the 
others  
2 2
0 2 2( , )
a b
L LY Y Y∈  One developer develops 




inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)













( , ( )( ) )
1 ( ) (2)
b r
L






One developer at 




inf{ 0 : ( ) ( )( ) }
1 ( / ) (2)













(( )( ) ,







If one developer develops first, 
then the other develops 
immediately 
No information 
is transmitted  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Summaries 
8.1 Contributions 
This study aims to developed a pure theoretical framework for analyzing 
optimal development timing decisions, that will be applicable in both 
monopoly and oligopoly market. The followings are the finding in thesis that 
will contribute to better understand real options in real estate.  
1. The first addresses explicitly the real options model in a monopolistic market 
structure. The existing one firm real options model does not fit well into a 
monopolistic market framework or into a competitive market structure. 
There is no competition in the one firm real options model, which is 
contradictory to the competitive market theory; at the same time the agent in 
the model is assumed to be price-taker, which is again inconsistent with the 
assumptions in the monopoly theory. By explicitly assuming the market 
structure of monopoly, the optimal timing and optimal intensity problem can 
be solved simultaneously. The optimal intensity is obtained endogenously 
when the market demand and supply are in equilibrium, compared to the 
model of deriving the optimal density using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in a competitive market. Technically this derivation is more 
complicated, nonetheless more realistic, especially for the case of real estate 
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development. The results show that both the cash flow uncertainty and the 
demand function have significant impact on the optimal timing decision, and 
the demand elasticity also plays an important role in determining the 
development option value. 
2. This thesis also examines the effect of asymmetric duopoly market, while 
most of the existing literature concentrates on only symmetric duopoly 
cases. The asymmetric duopoly differs from the symmetric duopoly model 
in the equilibrium strategies. Different level of asymmetry will significantly 
affect the equilibrium strategies, and the symmetric case can be modeled as 
an extreme case in this study. The equilibrium strategies under different 
levels of asymmetry are theoretically evaluated. Asymmetry gives the 
comparatively advantageous developer more power and flexibility in 
selecting the optimal timing of development that will maximize his profit. 
In some cases the stronger developer can even have monopoly power, in the 
sense that he can ignore the preemptive competition from other developer. 
This situation cannot be observed in symmetric cases. 
3. The existing literature sparse on option game models under incomplete 
information. Grenadier (2000) is one of the researches that have made 
significant contribution of research in this area. In this study, I followed the 
idea in Grenadier (2000) that the information is only revealed only through 
option exercising actions. While In Grenadier (2000) model, he assumes an 
exogenous payoff when exercising the option. In our model, the payoff is 
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endogenously determined in an explicit duopoly model. The equilibrium 
strategies are derived based on the complete information asymmetric 
duopoly model.  
8.2 Limitations 
However, being a master degree thesis, this study has also many limitations: 
1. The model presented in this study is not easily extended to the oligopoly 
case with more than 2 players. It will add great complexity to the model if 
the oligopoly model is analyzed in the same way.   
2. There are no empirical tests conducted in this study. The theory is not 
verified with real world real estate development cases due to the difficulty 
in obtaining relevant data.  
3. There is, however, slight inconsistency with respect to the optimal density 
questions.  For brevity reason the optimal density that are modeled in the 
simple monopolistic cases is not extended to the duopoly games in the 
subsequent chapters. In the duopoly models the development intensity is 
normalize to minimize the complexity of the mathematical derivation.  
 
8.3 Further Directions 
Limitations are not an obstacle. Some further directions of research can be 
carried out along the following directions 
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1. A more generalized oligopoly model in the real options and game 
theoretical framework can be explored, like those proposed by Wang and 
Zhou (2004),   who extend Grenadier (1996a) framework to a general 
oligopoly setting. The present model could be extended to a general 
oligopoly market setting to allow more general applications. 
2. The empirical testing of the theory obtained in this study can be done by 
collecting vast amount of data of real estate development. There is already 
some empirical works done in testing the one firm real options model 
Therefore, empirical tests of the proposed duopoly models can be proposed 
in the future. 
3. The study of the optimal intensity together with the optimal timing problem 
can be modeled by using more sophisticated mathematical tools and also 
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